Today's ST carried an interesting article about Bear Mkt predictions. This is GOOD!!!
This shows that the market might be nearing a bottom. The major newspapers always GET IT WRONG at almost EXACTLY the WRONG TIME. As more and more newspapers report doom and gloom will mean the end is VERY NEAR .
The USA today carried an article back in late 2002 about the end of the Financial markets due to the collapse of the DOTCOM bubble and within a couple of weeks, the new BULL market took off. Be on the lookout for major index trend reversals.
Last night mark a fresh rally attempt by the indices and is counted as Day 1 of attempt rally, after it undercuts its recent low on Wednesday. Why don't you just get in on Monday? I suggest not cos' winning in the market is all about probability.
More money has been lost by trying to predict and pre-empt market tops and bottoms. Let the market guide you on what it is doing.
U want to make 20% gains with 90% probability of succeeding (the trend in your favor) than make 25% gain with 70% probability of downside risk.
During last year's 3 mth long correction from May to August, many punters/investors were losing heart in the market by the 3rd month and when Nasdaq had a follow thro' on Aug 15, it took STI a full week to catch up and start its uptrend. We are only about 3 weeks into this correction and already I am seeing ppe.
Until the market shows a trend reversal, it is safer to stay in cash. The market will always be there, just don't lose your capital.
Sunday, November 25, 2007
Monday, November 5, 2007
溫總降温港股回氣
聽到溫總這樣替港股直通車潑冷水，顯然有降溫味道，香港股民可能已涼了一大截，怕港股要暴挫了，陸羽仁認為跌是會跌，但溫總這樣講，短期利淡，中長線是中性偏好，即係話港股短期本來都要調整，而家借勢調整得深啲都唔出奇，但暫時唔需要擔心因為這個消息有股災。
過去陸羽仁一直擔心，港股直通車開通之日，就是港股到頂之時，因為這些全世界都知的巨型利好消息，一旦實現，就是大戶瘋狂出貨之時；同樣道理，人人都估美國聯儲局上月底會減息0.25厘，結果真係減0.25厘，消息公佈後應該會回吐，第一日唔回吐，第二日都會回吐，亦都係同樣道理。
溫總如今對港股直通車的解說，只能得出一個結論：拖，這件事會拖下去，不是不做，但有排不會實現。若果港股直通車帶來的暴升只能以暴跌收場，拖慢了港股直通車，就會拖慢了整過燃燒過程，港股可以拖長來炒矣。
港股直通車放慢的消息一出，壞處人所共知，股市也會調整；但港股直通車放慢也不是一壞到底的消息，也有少少另類的正面角度，要平衡分析，首先，QDII (合資格境內投資者機制)不會放慢，會繼續推行，這個兩個月還有2000多億QDII資金出籠，假設一半買港股，還有1000多億資金會投入港股，這條水源不會乾。其次，港股直通車一日未放行，倒過來就會變成造淡者頭上的懸劍，即使有大戶炒不起港股想改行做淡，也要小心造到成災之日，大陸突然放行港股直通車，谷番高港股，變成造淡也有大風險.
溫總講話後，各方資金也要重新計計數，再定下一步策略，潛入來炒港股的北水要決定是否炒下去，借這些消息炒高港股的外資大戶也要重新部署炒作策略。港元波動，似有大炒家在後面炒作，上月下旬期指加了按金，由12萬幾加到15萬幾，熟悉期指運作的中環茶友話，期指加按金，除了因為指數上升的正常增加之外，亦可能因為倉位傾斜，即是話交易所看到好倉或淡倉一方，倉位異常集中，例如有幾個大戶做了大量好倉(或大量淡倉)，這樣就會令市場風險增加，要加按金去平衡風險，若有大戶炒作，當然不會這麼易就收手，他們會因應局勢變化，重新定位。
如今溫總咁講變相為港股降溫，如前所述，炒作港股的外資大戶轉行做淡也有大風險，所以較可能是順勢先放低一段，還港股先回一回氣，遠的不說，光說這一個月，上半個月好可能係調整月，先走一段向下走勢。
睇市唔能夠只睇一兩日，要睇出一個走勢，第一重要的是宏觀分析，睇到三個月甚至更長的走勢是向上還是向下，睇好有一個炒法，睇淡有一個炒法，例如你全面看淡，就要徹底清貨，但假如你中線看好，認為目前只是調整或深度調整，就不要清貨，否則清完貨可能來不及買番，股市又升番上去。
陸羽仁估目前的市場只是調整，不是股災，宏觀分析不能決定即日的走勢，今日或者最近幾日，都好可能係跌市。
有了宏觀分析，可以決定中期策略(一個月內)，陸羽仁維持原來看法，28,000點以上，平貨好少，「投資的我」只宜做塘邊鶴，頂多抽吓新股就好；但「投機的我」就可以靜待股市回吐的時機，希望個市跌得深啲，如果手上好多現金無乜股票，可以等股市調整得多一點時，分段吸貨。
至於短期策略，陸羽仁不是專家，擅短炒的中環茶友就話，月頭有機會反覆調整，到月尾有機回穩向上，即係月頭調整完又彈吓，跟着又尋底，亦要留意北水走向，如果北水急促調走，就要小心。
過去陸羽仁一直擔心，港股直通車開通之日，就是港股到頂之時，因為這些全世界都知的巨型利好消息，一旦實現，就是大戶瘋狂出貨之時；同樣道理，人人都估美國聯儲局上月底會減息0.25厘，結果真係減0.25厘，消息公佈後應該會回吐，第一日唔回吐，第二日都會回吐，亦都係同樣道理。
溫總如今對港股直通車的解說，只能得出一個結論：拖，這件事會拖下去，不是不做，但有排不會實現。若果港股直通車帶來的暴升只能以暴跌收場，拖慢了港股直通車，就會拖慢了整過燃燒過程，港股可以拖長來炒矣。
港股直通車放慢的消息一出，壞處人所共知，股市也會調整；但港股直通車放慢也不是一壞到底的消息，也有少少另類的正面角度，要平衡分析，首先，QDII (合資格境內投資者機制)不會放慢，會繼續推行，這個兩個月還有2000多億QDII資金出籠，假設一半買港股，還有1000多億資金會投入港股，這條水源不會乾。其次，港股直通車一日未放行，倒過來就會變成造淡者頭上的懸劍，即使有大戶炒不起港股想改行做淡，也要小心造到成災之日，大陸突然放行港股直通車，谷番高港股，變成造淡也有大風險.
溫總講話後，各方資金也要重新計計數，再定下一步策略，潛入來炒港股的北水要決定是否炒下去，借這些消息炒高港股的外資大戶也要重新部署炒作策略。港元波動，似有大炒家在後面炒作，上月下旬期指加了按金，由12萬幾加到15萬幾，熟悉期指運作的中環茶友話，期指加按金，除了因為指數上升的正常增加之外，亦可能因為倉位傾斜，即是話交易所看到好倉或淡倉一方，倉位異常集中，例如有幾個大戶做了大量好倉(或大量淡倉)，這樣就會令市場風險增加，要加按金去平衡風險，若有大戶炒作，當然不會這麼易就收手，他們會因應局勢變化，重新定位。
如今溫總咁講變相為港股降溫，如前所述，炒作港股的外資大戶轉行做淡也有大風險，所以較可能是順勢先放低一段，還港股先回一回氣，遠的不說，光說這一個月，上半個月好可能係調整月，先走一段向下走勢。
睇市唔能夠只睇一兩日，要睇出一個走勢，第一重要的是宏觀分析，睇到三個月甚至更長的走勢是向上還是向下，睇好有一個炒法，睇淡有一個炒法，例如你全面看淡，就要徹底清貨，但假如你中線看好，認為目前只是調整或深度調整，就不要清貨，否則清完貨可能來不及買番，股市又升番上去。
陸羽仁估目前的市場只是調整，不是股災，宏觀分析不能決定即日的走勢，今日或者最近幾日，都好可能係跌市。
有了宏觀分析，可以決定中期策略(一個月內)，陸羽仁維持原來看法，28,000點以上，平貨好少，「投資的我」只宜做塘邊鶴，頂多抽吓新股就好；但「投機的我」就可以靜待股市回吐的時機，希望個市跌得深啲，如果手上好多現金無乜股票，可以等股市調整得多一點時，分段吸貨。
至於短期策略，陸羽仁不是專家，擅短炒的中環茶友就話，月頭有機會反覆調整，到月尾有機回穩向上，即係月頭調整完又彈吓，跟着又尋底，亦要留意北水走向，如果北水急促調走，就要小心。
"Credit Crisis Worse Than Long-Term Capital Management Collapse in ’98"
Pundits who are likening today’s market rout to that of 1998, and who expect the market to rally strongly towards the end of this year and to close at a new all-time high, are failing to consider the very different economic and financial circumstances of today, compared to those of 1998. In the years leading up to the 1998 crisis the US dollar was in a bull market, and interest rates - which had peaked in September 1981 - were in the middle of a secular decline.
At the same time, gold and other commodities were still deflating. Also, in the 1990s, the US stock market had significantly outperformed the emerging markets, most of which had peaked out between 1990 and 1994 and had crashed during the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
Therefore, in 1998, the emerging markets and commodity prices were very depressed (unlike today). Moreover, in 1998, house prices weren’t elevated, the subprime lending industry was in its infancy, Japan and Europe were largely stagnant, and Asia and Russia were in depression (i.e. there was no synchronised global growth).
The process of securitisation existed, but was very modest when compared to the present.Today, the key difference is that the dollar looks extremely wobbly. In 1998, the US current account deficit was 2% of GDP; today, it’s hovering around 8%. This massive deficit puts continuous pressure on the dollar. Moreover, gold and other commodities are in an uptrend.
There is another reason why conditions today are very different from those in 1998: in 1998, total credit market debt to GDP was 250%; today, it’s 330%. In addition, whereas debt growth averaged 4% per anum in the 1990s, it has averaged almost 10% per annum since 2002. In particular, household debt has surged from 65% of GDP in 1998 to almost 100% in 2007. Since debt growth has been so strong in the last few years, and because the system is now far more leveraged than in 1998 (not to mention the derivatives market), a tidal wave of liquidity would be needed to bail out the system, which would have to lead to even stronger debt growth; but, obviously, it wouldonly lead to even larger dislocations and problems later.
Another difference: in 1998, the Fed had to deal with the bailout of just one institution — LTCM; today, who should it bail out: the subprime lending institutions (it’s too late), leveraged home owners, the US$2 trillion-plus collateralised debt obligation (CDO) market, or the financial institutions, which are now stuck with over US$200 billion of leveraged buyout (LBO) loan commitments which they cannot sell to investors? So, whereas it was relatively easy to bail out just one institution in 1998, today the task would be extremely complex and daunting. Of course, the Fed could try to bail out everybody by cutting the interest rate aggressively and taking “extraordinary measures”, such as buying up the entire CDO market. [Note: Faber wrote the words above in late August, well before the Fed’s aggressive rate cut yesterday.]
Aggressive Fed fund rate cuts may not help much for the following reason: from June 2004 to August 2006, the Fed increased its fund rate in 17 baby steps from 1% to 5-1/4%. During this period of “tightening”, no actual tightening took place because credit growth accelerated as lending standards were eased and leverage increased. Moreover, as Bridgewater Associates recently pointed out, “globally, central banks have kept interest rate levels out of line with economic growth rates”. So, even if the Fed were to cut rates massively now, it is unlikely that it would stimulate credit growth, which, as I have explained repeatedly in the past, must continuously expand at an accelerating rate in a credit- and asset-driven economy in order to keep the economic plane from losing altitude.
Accelerating credit growth is most unlikely now, because I cannot see how financial intermediaries will ease lending standards any time soon after the losses they have recently endured and following their dismal stock performance.In addition, being fairly familiar with the cowardly attitude of investors, it is most unlikely that investors will now wish to buy anything other than top-quality paper and solid companies’ shares.
Therefore, I can see only one solution if the Fed really wanted to attempt to bail out the system, and that would be for it to drastically cut interest rates. Unfortunately, massive interest rate cuts at present may not help much and could potentially have very negative side-effects (an even weaker dollar, inflation, rising long-term interest rates, further widening of income and wealth inequity etc.)
The crises that build up in international financial structures always ricochet from country to country…. Boom, distress and panic are transmitted through a variety of connections between national economies: psychological infection, rising and falling prices of commodities and securities, short-term capital movements, interest rates, the rise and fall of world commodity inventories.These connections, moreover, can take various forms, and may be interrelated in various ways…. Boom and panic in one country seem to induce boom and panic in others, often through purely psychological channels…. Just as one huge bubble breeds others in a country, so a host of bubbles in a financial market seems to inspire the production of others in other countries.
For the last several years, investors have enjoyed a massive global boom. But they should not rule out a massive global panic.
Dr Marc Faber
Sep 20th, 2007
At the same time, gold and other commodities were still deflating. Also, in the 1990s, the US stock market had significantly outperformed the emerging markets, most of which had peaked out between 1990 and 1994 and had crashed during the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
Therefore, in 1998, the emerging markets and commodity prices were very depressed (unlike today). Moreover, in 1998, house prices weren’t elevated, the subprime lending industry was in its infancy, Japan and Europe were largely stagnant, and Asia and Russia were in depression (i.e. there was no synchronised global growth).
The process of securitisation existed, but was very modest when compared to the present.Today, the key difference is that the dollar looks extremely wobbly. In 1998, the US current account deficit was 2% of GDP; today, it’s hovering around 8%. This massive deficit puts continuous pressure on the dollar. Moreover, gold and other commodities are in an uptrend.
There is another reason why conditions today are very different from those in 1998: in 1998, total credit market debt to GDP was 250%; today, it’s 330%. In addition, whereas debt growth averaged 4% per anum in the 1990s, it has averaged almost 10% per annum since 2002. In particular, household debt has surged from 65% of GDP in 1998 to almost 100% in 2007. Since debt growth has been so strong in the last few years, and because the system is now far more leveraged than in 1998 (not to mention the derivatives market), a tidal wave of liquidity would be needed to bail out the system, which would have to lead to even stronger debt growth; but, obviously, it wouldonly lead to even larger dislocations and problems later.
Another difference: in 1998, the Fed had to deal with the bailout of just one institution — LTCM; today, who should it bail out: the subprime lending institutions (it’s too late), leveraged home owners, the US$2 trillion-plus collateralised debt obligation (CDO) market, or the financial institutions, which are now stuck with over US$200 billion of leveraged buyout (LBO) loan commitments which they cannot sell to investors? So, whereas it was relatively easy to bail out just one institution in 1998, today the task would be extremely complex and daunting. Of course, the Fed could try to bail out everybody by cutting the interest rate aggressively and taking “extraordinary measures”, such as buying up the entire CDO market. [Note: Faber wrote the words above in late August, well before the Fed’s aggressive rate cut yesterday.]
Aggressive Fed fund rate cuts may not help much for the following reason: from June 2004 to August 2006, the Fed increased its fund rate in 17 baby steps from 1% to 5-1/4%. During this period of “tightening”, no actual tightening took place because credit growth accelerated as lending standards were eased and leverage increased. Moreover, as Bridgewater Associates recently pointed out, “globally, central banks have kept interest rate levels out of line with economic growth rates”. So, even if the Fed were to cut rates massively now, it is unlikely that it would stimulate credit growth, which, as I have explained repeatedly in the past, must continuously expand at an accelerating rate in a credit- and asset-driven economy in order to keep the economic plane from losing altitude.
Accelerating credit growth is most unlikely now, because I cannot see how financial intermediaries will ease lending standards any time soon after the losses they have recently endured and following their dismal stock performance.In addition, being fairly familiar with the cowardly attitude of investors, it is most unlikely that investors will now wish to buy anything other than top-quality paper and solid companies’ shares.
Therefore, I can see only one solution if the Fed really wanted to attempt to bail out the system, and that would be for it to drastically cut interest rates. Unfortunately, massive interest rate cuts at present may not help much and could potentially have very negative side-effects (an even weaker dollar, inflation, rising long-term interest rates, further widening of income and wealth inequity etc.)
The crises that build up in international financial structures always ricochet from country to country…. Boom, distress and panic are transmitted through a variety of connections between national economies: psychological infection, rising and falling prices of commodities and securities, short-term capital movements, interest rates, the rise and fall of world commodity inventories.These connections, moreover, can take various forms, and may be interrelated in various ways…. Boom and panic in one country seem to induce boom and panic in others, often through purely psychological channels…. Just as one huge bubble breeds others in a country, so a host of bubbles in a financial market seems to inspire the production of others in other countries.
For the last several years, investors have enjoyed a massive global boom. But they should not rule out a massive global panic.
Dr Marc Faber
Sep 20th, 2007
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