With Mr. Market currently being so manic-depressive and seeing only bad days ahead, it is important to remember that he is there to serve you, not to instruct you.
The pervasiveness of his mood swings has the ability to affect all but those who inherently understand the true value of a business. Market watchers and pundits who are paid to say something about the market everyday will come up with a myriad of reasons why Mr. Market is pessimistic, and a dearth of bad news will continually stream in to reinforce this perception.
Thus, the resultant effect is a massive sell off by hedge funds and mutual funds because they too are affected by the fear and panic which is spread by Mr. Market. Oh, what mischief this man can do ! Sometimes, when I glance at the market, I can almost see Mr. Market’s evil face grinning at me as he waves his hands over the market, causing millions to panic and dump their holdings at the lowest possible price (no, I am not schizophrenic, I am just using a metaphor !). This hardens my resolve not to listen to him but to focus on the true worth of the companies I hold.A falling market is the ultimate test for a value investor. It is mentioned in value investing books that you never know if the companies you pick have the ability to survive Mr. Market’s manic mood swings, and there is no way to know if your portfolio is sound until it is tested by fire. Thus, when I view the current market situation, I see myself facing the “exam” which I have been “studying” for these past 18 months. All the research, reading, analysis and thinking has gone into identifying good companies selling at a fraction of their true worth; but now the time has come to see if the buy-and-hold strategy will ultimately win over the “fast profit” strategy of churning your portfolio.With this in mind, I would like to reiterate to readers that the goal of sound and intelligent investing is not for quick gains or huge profits. If you want those, please go to the nearest 4-D or Toto booth, put down a few dollars; then hope and pray for yourself to strike the lottery !
In fact, the most important tenet for value investing should be capital preservation. With this, I mean that one should invest with such a wide margin of safety that losses are largely minimized, while gains are almost certainly assured. Too many people throw their money into the market with only the upside in mind; they never think of the potential LOSS they may face, and always end up shocked and stunned when the market turns against them.It is also prudent to note that one can actually make a lot of money by avoiding losses. What do I mean by this ? It simply means you don’t go out there and take unnecessary risks, like buying into a company you don’t understand, subscribing for IPOs (which subsequently tank) or chasing a company’s share price just because it has just rallied. Please note that avoiding such mistakes can actually make you much richer even if you do NOT know a thing about value investing; as compared to people who keep chasing the next hot tip, or buy at the peak of a bull market, or simply buy indiscriminately. This may sound quite incredible, but one can actually compound their money better in a bank (earning a paltry 0.25% interest per annum for POSB) than letting the market eat up their money through poor judgement and bad decisions.To conclude, I would say that for one to really practice value investing or go down the path of value investing, one has to change one’s mindset radically.
Most investment professionals or fund managers will preach about how their fund has generated the highest returns or how a particular sector is “hot” or “growing at an exponential rate”.
Just try asking them about capital preservation and they will become evasive and uncomfortable, and tell you that “in investing, there are always risks, so we must assess if you are high, medium or low risk; so that we can tailor the portfolio to suit your needs”. What I say is: investing is only risky if you do not have capital preservation in mind, and fund managers who invest only thinking of gains are not doing their clients a favour. In order for an investor to do well in the long-run (yes, not short-term !), one has to make capital preservation the central concept in one’s investment philosophy.
Sunday, December 2, 2007
Sunday, November 25, 2007
Market predictions
Today's ST carried an interesting article about Bear Mkt predictions. This is GOOD!!!
This shows that the market might be nearing a bottom. The major newspapers always GET IT WRONG at almost EXACTLY the WRONG TIME. As more and more newspapers report doom and gloom will mean the end is VERY NEAR .
The USA today carried an article back in late 2002 about the end of the Financial markets due to the collapse of the DOTCOM bubble and within a couple of weeks, the new BULL market took off. Be on the lookout for major index trend reversals.
Last night mark a fresh rally attempt by the indices and is counted as Day 1 of attempt rally, after it undercuts its recent low on Wednesday. Why don't you just get in on Monday? I suggest not cos' winning in the market is all about probability.
More money has been lost by trying to predict and pre-empt market tops and bottoms. Let the market guide you on what it is doing.
U want to make 20% gains with 90% probability of succeeding (the trend in your favor) than make 25% gain with 70% probability of downside risk.
During last year's 3 mth long correction from May to August, many punters/investors were losing heart in the market by the 3rd month and when Nasdaq had a follow thro' on Aug 15, it took STI a full week to catch up and start its uptrend. We are only about 3 weeks into this correction and already I am seeing ppe.
Until the market shows a trend reversal, it is safer to stay in cash. The market will always be there, just don't lose your capital.
This shows that the market might be nearing a bottom. The major newspapers always GET IT WRONG at almost EXACTLY the WRONG TIME. As more and more newspapers report doom and gloom will mean the end is VERY NEAR .
The USA today carried an article back in late 2002 about the end of the Financial markets due to the collapse of the DOTCOM bubble and within a couple of weeks, the new BULL market took off. Be on the lookout for major index trend reversals.
Last night mark a fresh rally attempt by the indices and is counted as Day 1 of attempt rally, after it undercuts its recent low on Wednesday. Why don't you just get in on Monday? I suggest not cos' winning in the market is all about probability.
More money has been lost by trying to predict and pre-empt market tops and bottoms. Let the market guide you on what it is doing.
U want to make 20% gains with 90% probability of succeeding (the trend in your favor) than make 25% gain with 70% probability of downside risk.
During last year's 3 mth long correction from May to August, many punters/investors were losing heart in the market by the 3rd month and when Nasdaq had a follow thro' on Aug 15, it took STI a full week to catch up and start its uptrend. We are only about 3 weeks into this correction and already I am seeing ppe.
Until the market shows a trend reversal, it is safer to stay in cash. The market will always be there, just don't lose your capital.
Monday, November 5, 2007
溫總降温港股回氣
聽到溫總這樣替港股直通車潑冷水，顯然有降溫味道，香港股民可能已涼了一大截，怕港股要暴挫了，陸羽仁認為跌是會跌，但溫總這樣講，短期利淡，中長線是中性偏好，即係話港股短期本來都要調整，而家借勢調整得深啲都唔出奇，但暫時唔需要擔心因為這個消息有股災。
過去陸羽仁一直擔心，港股直通車開通之日，就是港股到頂之時，因為這些全世界都知的巨型利好消息，一旦實現，就是大戶瘋狂出貨之時；同樣道理，人人都估美國聯儲局上月底會減息0.25厘，結果真係減0.25厘，消息公佈後應該會回吐，第一日唔回吐，第二日都會回吐，亦都係同樣道理。
溫總如今對港股直通車的解說，只能得出一個結論：拖，這件事會拖下去，不是不做，但有排不會實現。若果港股直通車帶來的暴升只能以暴跌收場，拖慢了港股直通車，就會拖慢了整過燃燒過程，港股可以拖長來炒矣。
港股直通車放慢的消息一出，壞處人所共知，股市也會調整；但港股直通車放慢也不是一壞到底的消息，也有少少另類的正面角度，要平衡分析，首先，QDII (合資格境內投資者機制)不會放慢，會繼續推行，這個兩個月還有2000多億QDII資金出籠，假設一半買港股，還有1000多億資金會投入港股，這條水源不會乾。其次，港股直通車一日未放行，倒過來就會變成造淡者頭上的懸劍，即使有大戶炒不起港股想改行做淡，也要小心造到成災之日，大陸突然放行港股直通車，谷番高港股，變成造淡也有大風險.
溫總講話後，各方資金也要重新計計數，再定下一步策略，潛入來炒港股的北水要決定是否炒下去，借這些消息炒高港股的外資大戶也要重新部署炒作策略。港元波動，似有大炒家在後面炒作，上月下旬期指加了按金，由12萬幾加到15萬幾，熟悉期指運作的中環茶友話，期指加按金，除了因為指數上升的正常增加之外，亦可能因為倉位傾斜，即是話交易所看到好倉或淡倉一方，倉位異常集中，例如有幾個大戶做了大量好倉(或大量淡倉)，這樣就會令市場風險增加，要加按金去平衡風險，若有大戶炒作，當然不會這麼易就收手，他們會因應局勢變化，重新定位。
如今溫總咁講變相為港股降溫，如前所述，炒作港股的外資大戶轉行做淡也有大風險，所以較可能是順勢先放低一段，還港股先回一回氣，遠的不說，光說這一個月，上半個月好可能係調整月，先走一段向下走勢。
睇市唔能夠只睇一兩日，要睇出一個走勢，第一重要的是宏觀分析，睇到三個月甚至更長的走勢是向上還是向下，睇好有一個炒法，睇淡有一個炒法，例如你全面看淡，就要徹底清貨，但假如你中線看好，認為目前只是調整或深度調整，就不要清貨，否則清完貨可能來不及買番，股市又升番上去。
陸羽仁估目前的市場只是調整，不是股災，宏觀分析不能決定即日的走勢，今日或者最近幾日，都好可能係跌市。
有了宏觀分析，可以決定中期策略(一個月內)，陸羽仁維持原來看法，28,000點以上，平貨好少，「投資的我」只宜做塘邊鶴，頂多抽吓新股就好；但「投機的我」就可以靜待股市回吐的時機，希望個市跌得深啲，如果手上好多現金無乜股票，可以等股市調整得多一點時，分段吸貨。
至於短期策略，陸羽仁不是專家，擅短炒的中環茶友就話，月頭有機會反覆調整，到月尾有機回穩向上，即係月頭調整完又彈吓，跟着又尋底，亦要留意北水走向，如果北水急促調走，就要小心。
過去陸羽仁一直擔心，港股直通車開通之日，就是港股到頂之時，因為這些全世界都知的巨型利好消息，一旦實現，就是大戶瘋狂出貨之時；同樣道理，人人都估美國聯儲局上月底會減息0.25厘，結果真係減0.25厘，消息公佈後應該會回吐，第一日唔回吐，第二日都會回吐，亦都係同樣道理。
溫總如今對港股直通車的解說，只能得出一個結論：拖，這件事會拖下去，不是不做，但有排不會實現。若果港股直通車帶來的暴升只能以暴跌收場，拖慢了港股直通車，就會拖慢了整過燃燒過程，港股可以拖長來炒矣。
港股直通車放慢的消息一出，壞處人所共知，股市也會調整；但港股直通車放慢也不是一壞到底的消息，也有少少另類的正面角度，要平衡分析，首先，QDII (合資格境內投資者機制)不會放慢，會繼續推行，這個兩個月還有2000多億QDII資金出籠，假設一半買港股，還有1000多億資金會投入港股，這條水源不會乾。其次，港股直通車一日未放行，倒過來就會變成造淡者頭上的懸劍，即使有大戶炒不起港股想改行做淡，也要小心造到成災之日，大陸突然放行港股直通車，谷番高港股，變成造淡也有大風險.
溫總講話後，各方資金也要重新計計數，再定下一步策略，潛入來炒港股的北水要決定是否炒下去，借這些消息炒高港股的外資大戶也要重新部署炒作策略。港元波動，似有大炒家在後面炒作，上月下旬期指加了按金，由12萬幾加到15萬幾，熟悉期指運作的中環茶友話，期指加按金，除了因為指數上升的正常增加之外，亦可能因為倉位傾斜，即是話交易所看到好倉或淡倉一方，倉位異常集中，例如有幾個大戶做了大量好倉(或大量淡倉)，這樣就會令市場風險增加，要加按金去平衡風險，若有大戶炒作，當然不會這麼易就收手，他們會因應局勢變化，重新定位。
如今溫總咁講變相為港股降溫，如前所述，炒作港股的外資大戶轉行做淡也有大風險，所以較可能是順勢先放低一段，還港股先回一回氣，遠的不說，光說這一個月，上半個月好可能係調整月，先走一段向下走勢。
睇市唔能夠只睇一兩日，要睇出一個走勢，第一重要的是宏觀分析，睇到三個月甚至更長的走勢是向上還是向下，睇好有一個炒法，睇淡有一個炒法，例如你全面看淡，就要徹底清貨，但假如你中線看好，認為目前只是調整或深度調整，就不要清貨，否則清完貨可能來不及買番，股市又升番上去。
陸羽仁估目前的市場只是調整，不是股災，宏觀分析不能決定即日的走勢，今日或者最近幾日，都好可能係跌市。
有了宏觀分析，可以決定中期策略(一個月內)，陸羽仁維持原來看法，28,000點以上，平貨好少，「投資的我」只宜做塘邊鶴，頂多抽吓新股就好；但「投機的我」就可以靜待股市回吐的時機，希望個市跌得深啲，如果手上好多現金無乜股票，可以等股市調整得多一點時，分段吸貨。
至於短期策略，陸羽仁不是專家，擅短炒的中環茶友就話，月頭有機會反覆調整，到月尾有機回穩向上，即係月頭調整完又彈吓，跟着又尋底，亦要留意北水走向，如果北水急促調走，就要小心。
"Credit Crisis Worse Than Long-Term Capital Management Collapse in ’98"
Pundits who are likening today’s market rout to that of 1998, and who expect the market to rally strongly towards the end of this year and to close at a new all-time high, are failing to consider the very different economic and financial circumstances of today, compared to those of 1998. In the years leading up to the 1998 crisis the US dollar was in a bull market, and interest rates - which had peaked in September 1981 - were in the middle of a secular decline.
At the same time, gold and other commodities were still deflating. Also, in the 1990s, the US stock market had significantly outperformed the emerging markets, most of which had peaked out between 1990 and 1994 and had crashed during the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
Therefore, in 1998, the emerging markets and commodity prices were very depressed (unlike today). Moreover, in 1998, house prices weren’t elevated, the subprime lending industry was in its infancy, Japan and Europe were largely stagnant, and Asia and Russia were in depression (i.e. there was no synchronised global growth).
The process of securitisation existed, but was very modest when compared to the present.Today, the key difference is that the dollar looks extremely wobbly. In 1998, the US current account deficit was 2% of GDP; today, it’s hovering around 8%. This massive deficit puts continuous pressure on the dollar. Moreover, gold and other commodities are in an uptrend.
There is another reason why conditions today are very different from those in 1998: in 1998, total credit market debt to GDP was 250%; today, it’s 330%. In addition, whereas debt growth averaged 4% per anum in the 1990s, it has averaged almost 10% per annum since 2002. In particular, household debt has surged from 65% of GDP in 1998 to almost 100% in 2007. Since debt growth has been so strong in the last few years, and because the system is now far more leveraged than in 1998 (not to mention the derivatives market), a tidal wave of liquidity would be needed to bail out the system, which would have to lead to even stronger debt growth; but, obviously, it wouldonly lead to even larger dislocations and problems later.
Another difference: in 1998, the Fed had to deal with the bailout of just one institution — LTCM; today, who should it bail out: the subprime lending institutions (it’s too late), leveraged home owners, the US$2 trillion-plus collateralised debt obligation (CDO) market, or the financial institutions, which are now stuck with over US$200 billion of leveraged buyout (LBO) loan commitments which they cannot sell to investors? So, whereas it was relatively easy to bail out just one institution in 1998, today the task would be extremely complex and daunting. Of course, the Fed could try to bail out everybody by cutting the interest rate aggressively and taking “extraordinary measures”, such as buying up the entire CDO market. [Note: Faber wrote the words above in late August, well before the Fed’s aggressive rate cut yesterday.]
Aggressive Fed fund rate cuts may not help much for the following reason: from June 2004 to August 2006, the Fed increased its fund rate in 17 baby steps from 1% to 5-1/4%. During this period of “tightening”, no actual tightening took place because credit growth accelerated as lending standards were eased and leverage increased. Moreover, as Bridgewater Associates recently pointed out, “globally, central banks have kept interest rate levels out of line with economic growth rates”. So, even if the Fed were to cut rates massively now, it is unlikely that it would stimulate credit growth, which, as I have explained repeatedly in the past, must continuously expand at an accelerating rate in a credit- and asset-driven economy in order to keep the economic plane from losing altitude.
Accelerating credit growth is most unlikely now, because I cannot see how financial intermediaries will ease lending standards any time soon after the losses they have recently endured and following their dismal stock performance.In addition, being fairly familiar with the cowardly attitude of investors, it is most unlikely that investors will now wish to buy anything other than top-quality paper and solid companies’ shares.
Therefore, I can see only one solution if the Fed really wanted to attempt to bail out the system, and that would be for it to drastically cut interest rates. Unfortunately, massive interest rate cuts at present may not help much and could potentially have very negative side-effects (an even weaker dollar, inflation, rising long-term interest rates, further widening of income and wealth inequity etc.)
The crises that build up in international financial structures always ricochet from country to country…. Boom, distress and panic are transmitted through a variety of connections between national economies: psychological infection, rising and falling prices of commodities and securities, short-term capital movements, interest rates, the rise and fall of world commodity inventories.These connections, moreover, can take various forms, and may be interrelated in various ways…. Boom and panic in one country seem to induce boom and panic in others, often through purely psychological channels…. Just as one huge bubble breeds others in a country, so a host of bubbles in a financial market seems to inspire the production of others in other countries.
For the last several years, investors have enjoyed a massive global boom. But they should not rule out a massive global panic.
Dr Marc Faber
Sep 20th, 2007
At the same time, gold and other commodities were still deflating. Also, in the 1990s, the US stock market had significantly outperformed the emerging markets, most of which had peaked out between 1990 and 1994 and had crashed during the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
Therefore, in 1998, the emerging markets and commodity prices were very depressed (unlike today). Moreover, in 1998, house prices weren’t elevated, the subprime lending industry was in its infancy, Japan and Europe were largely stagnant, and Asia and Russia were in depression (i.e. there was no synchronised global growth).
The process of securitisation existed, but was very modest when compared to the present.Today, the key difference is that the dollar looks extremely wobbly. In 1998, the US current account deficit was 2% of GDP; today, it’s hovering around 8%. This massive deficit puts continuous pressure on the dollar. Moreover, gold and other commodities are in an uptrend.
There is another reason why conditions today are very different from those in 1998: in 1998, total credit market debt to GDP was 250%; today, it’s 330%. In addition, whereas debt growth averaged 4% per anum in the 1990s, it has averaged almost 10% per annum since 2002. In particular, household debt has surged from 65% of GDP in 1998 to almost 100% in 2007. Since debt growth has been so strong in the last few years, and because the system is now far more leveraged than in 1998 (not to mention the derivatives market), a tidal wave of liquidity would be needed to bail out the system, which would have to lead to even stronger debt growth; but, obviously, it wouldonly lead to even larger dislocations and problems later.
Another difference: in 1998, the Fed had to deal with the bailout of just one institution — LTCM; today, who should it bail out: the subprime lending institutions (it’s too late), leveraged home owners, the US$2 trillion-plus collateralised debt obligation (CDO) market, or the financial institutions, which are now stuck with over US$200 billion of leveraged buyout (LBO) loan commitments which they cannot sell to investors? So, whereas it was relatively easy to bail out just one institution in 1998, today the task would be extremely complex and daunting. Of course, the Fed could try to bail out everybody by cutting the interest rate aggressively and taking “extraordinary measures”, such as buying up the entire CDO market. [Note: Faber wrote the words above in late August, well before the Fed’s aggressive rate cut yesterday.]
Aggressive Fed fund rate cuts may not help much for the following reason: from June 2004 to August 2006, the Fed increased its fund rate in 17 baby steps from 1% to 5-1/4%. During this period of “tightening”, no actual tightening took place because credit growth accelerated as lending standards were eased and leverage increased. Moreover, as Bridgewater Associates recently pointed out, “globally, central banks have kept interest rate levels out of line with economic growth rates”. So, even if the Fed were to cut rates massively now, it is unlikely that it would stimulate credit growth, which, as I have explained repeatedly in the past, must continuously expand at an accelerating rate in a credit- and asset-driven economy in order to keep the economic plane from losing altitude.
Accelerating credit growth is most unlikely now, because I cannot see how financial intermediaries will ease lending standards any time soon after the losses they have recently endured and following their dismal stock performance.In addition, being fairly familiar with the cowardly attitude of investors, it is most unlikely that investors will now wish to buy anything other than top-quality paper and solid companies’ shares.
Therefore, I can see only one solution if the Fed really wanted to attempt to bail out the system, and that would be for it to drastically cut interest rates. Unfortunately, massive interest rate cuts at present may not help much and could potentially have very negative side-effects (an even weaker dollar, inflation, rising long-term interest rates, further widening of income and wealth inequity etc.)
The crises that build up in international financial structures always ricochet from country to country…. Boom, distress and panic are transmitted through a variety of connections between national economies: psychological infection, rising and falling prices of commodities and securities, short-term capital movements, interest rates, the rise and fall of world commodity inventories.These connections, moreover, can take various forms, and may be interrelated in various ways…. Boom and panic in one country seem to induce boom and panic in others, often through purely psychological channels…. Just as one huge bubble breeds others in a country, so a host of bubbles in a financial market seems to inspire the production of others in other countries.
For the last several years, investors have enjoyed a massive global boom. But they should not rule out a massive global panic.
Dr Marc Faber
Sep 20th, 2007
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
Staying High and Dry in a Recession
There's an old saying that goes, "It's a recession if your neighbor loses his job. It's a depression if you lose your job."
Watching the financial news networks and reading the financial publications these days, you'll see many people asking if the U.S. economy is heading into a recession. From my vantage point, the answer is yes. I believe that for many people in certain industries, like real estate, the worst is yet to come.
Economic Ripple Effects
Before getting into why I think there will be a recession, it's important to know the specific definition of the term. Very simply, a recession is a decline in a country's gross domestic product (GDP) for at least two quarters. That means that by Christmas we'll know if we're in a recession or not.
In some ways, the coming recession is a product of the physical phenomenon known as precession. Precession is the effect of bodies in motion upon other bodies in motion -- or, more simply, a ripple effect, like when you throw a stone into a still pond and the waves emanating from it overlap.
While there are many such processional "waves" in the coming recession, one is the lack of integrity in the U.S. monetary system. The United States has defaulted on its financial promises many times in recent history. In 1934, we defaulted on domestic gold redemption. That year, it became illegal for U.S. citizens to own gold. Instead, the government required Americans to turn in their gold, and they were paid $20 in paper money for every ounce of gold they surrendered.
Once the gold was collected, the government raised the price of gold to $35 an ounce. Talk about a lack of integrity. And in 1968, the U.S. defaulted on silver redemption, taking U.S. dollars backed by silver out of circulation. Finally, in 1971, the U.S. defaulted on international gold redemption.
International Impact
Another reason for the coming recession is the subprime mess. And while issues related to the subprime fiasco may seem domestic, they actually have severe international consequences. The subprime mess seems to be a problem associated with lower-income people who can't afford their homes, yet it's really the tip of a very large international iceberg, and it'll affect all of us. Here's why.
In the Sept. 12, 2007, issue of Business Week, Kerry Capell asked the question, "Could any country be more exposed to the credit crunch than the U.S.?" The answer: "You bet, and that place is Britain."
Unlike many of its European neighbors, Britain shares many of America's financial traits. In the last few years, access to cheap credit in Britain has fueled a decade of economic growth, with home prices tripling in 10 years -- an even faster rise than in the United States. With cheap borrowed money, the English consumer has caused the British economy to boom; consumers are responsible for two-thirds of the British economy.
Today, Britain is more dependent upon financial services than we are. So what will happen to the world if both England and the United States go into a recession? The precessional effect is bound to be dire -- especially for working people.
Too Much Money
As strange as it may seem to the average person, the problem is not a shortage of money -- it's too much money. The world is choking on too many U.S. dollars.
Normally, when a currency gets into trouble as the dollar is now, all the country has to do is raise the interest rates on their bonds and things are fine again. But because of the subprime meltdown, the Federal Reserve can't simply raise or lower interest rates.
In simplified terms, the Fed must keep rates low in order to save the domestic economy. This causes the international economy to dump the dollar by not buying our bonds, which is one reason why the price of gold keeps going up -- it's the true international money. And the rise in its price (and in the price of oil) signals the loss of the purchasing power of the dollar; the world simply doesn't want any more dollars. This is a ripple effect from 1971, when the dollar came off the gold standard.
Less for More
The tragedy of this excess of money is that most of the world's workers have to work harder to earn less. This is because the currencies of the world are becoming less and less valuable. Even if workers get pay raises, the boost won't be able to keep pace with declines in the purchasing power of money, increases in expenses such as oil, decreases in the value of homes, declines in the value of stocks, and increases in taxes.
Just look at what's happened in the last decade. Ten years ago, gold was about $275 an ounce. Today, it's over $700. That means that, compared to gold, your income would've had to go up by 250 percent just to keep up with the loss in purchasing power of the dollar. Or, compared to oil -- which was about $10 a barrel 10 years ago and today is over $80 a barrel -- your income would've had to go up by 800 percent.
Sure, there are many people whose incomes have gone up way beyond 800 percent in the last 10 years. The problem is that most people's incomes haven't kept pace, and they're technically in a state of personal recession with no way out.
Throw Yourself a Lifeline
As the global economy continues to gyrate, you'll hear more and more people calling for the Federal Reserve to either lower or raise interest rates. The problem is that the Fed has less and less power to do much.
If it tries to save the domestic economy, the international economy will pound us. If the Fed tries to save the dollar internationally by raising interest rates, it'll kill the domestic economy.
Instead of looking to the Fed to save you, then, I recommend you save yourself by investing in real international money. One way to do so is by purchasing silver. Gold is expensive, but silver is still a bargain even for the little guy. When the recession comes, the ripple effect on your financial future will be immeasurable.
Watching the financial news networks and reading the financial publications these days, you'll see many people asking if the U.S. economy is heading into a recession. From my vantage point, the answer is yes. I believe that for many people in certain industries, like real estate, the worst is yet to come.
Economic Ripple Effects
Before getting into why I think there will be a recession, it's important to know the specific definition of the term. Very simply, a recession is a decline in a country's gross domestic product (GDP) for at least two quarters. That means that by Christmas we'll know if we're in a recession or not.
In some ways, the coming recession is a product of the physical phenomenon known as precession. Precession is the effect of bodies in motion upon other bodies in motion -- or, more simply, a ripple effect, like when you throw a stone into a still pond and the waves emanating from it overlap.
While there are many such processional "waves" in the coming recession, one is the lack of integrity in the U.S. monetary system. The United States has defaulted on its financial promises many times in recent history. In 1934, we defaulted on domestic gold redemption. That year, it became illegal for U.S. citizens to own gold. Instead, the government required Americans to turn in their gold, and they were paid $20 in paper money for every ounce of gold they surrendered.
Once the gold was collected, the government raised the price of gold to $35 an ounce. Talk about a lack of integrity. And in 1968, the U.S. defaulted on silver redemption, taking U.S. dollars backed by silver out of circulation. Finally, in 1971, the U.S. defaulted on international gold redemption.
International Impact
Another reason for the coming recession is the subprime mess. And while issues related to the subprime fiasco may seem domestic, they actually have severe international consequences. The subprime mess seems to be a problem associated with lower-income people who can't afford their homes, yet it's really the tip of a very large international iceberg, and it'll affect all of us. Here's why.
In the Sept. 12, 2007, issue of Business Week, Kerry Capell asked the question, "Could any country be more exposed to the credit crunch than the U.S.?" The answer: "You bet, and that place is Britain."
Unlike many of its European neighbors, Britain shares many of America's financial traits. In the last few years, access to cheap credit in Britain has fueled a decade of economic growth, with home prices tripling in 10 years -- an even faster rise than in the United States. With cheap borrowed money, the English consumer has caused the British economy to boom; consumers are responsible for two-thirds of the British economy.
Today, Britain is more dependent upon financial services than we are. So what will happen to the world if both England and the United States go into a recession? The precessional effect is bound to be dire -- especially for working people.
Too Much Money
As strange as it may seem to the average person, the problem is not a shortage of money -- it's too much money. The world is choking on too many U.S. dollars.
Normally, when a currency gets into trouble as the dollar is now, all the country has to do is raise the interest rates on their bonds and things are fine again. But because of the subprime meltdown, the Federal Reserve can't simply raise or lower interest rates.
In simplified terms, the Fed must keep rates low in order to save the domestic economy. This causes the international economy to dump the dollar by not buying our bonds, which is one reason why the price of gold keeps going up -- it's the true international money. And the rise in its price (and in the price of oil) signals the loss of the purchasing power of the dollar; the world simply doesn't want any more dollars. This is a ripple effect from 1971, when the dollar came off the gold standard.
Less for More
The tragedy of this excess of money is that most of the world's workers have to work harder to earn less. This is because the currencies of the world are becoming less and less valuable. Even if workers get pay raises, the boost won't be able to keep pace with declines in the purchasing power of money, increases in expenses such as oil, decreases in the value of homes, declines in the value of stocks, and increases in taxes.
Just look at what's happened in the last decade. Ten years ago, gold was about $275 an ounce. Today, it's over $700. That means that, compared to gold, your income would've had to go up by 250 percent just to keep up with the loss in purchasing power of the dollar. Or, compared to oil -- which was about $10 a barrel 10 years ago and today is over $80 a barrel -- your income would've had to go up by 800 percent.
Sure, there are many people whose incomes have gone up way beyond 800 percent in the last 10 years. The problem is that most people's incomes haven't kept pace, and they're technically in a state of personal recession with no way out.
Throw Yourself a Lifeline
As the global economy continues to gyrate, you'll hear more and more people calling for the Federal Reserve to either lower or raise interest rates. The problem is that the Fed has less and less power to do much.
If it tries to save the domestic economy, the international economy will pound us. If the Fed tries to save the dollar internationally by raising interest rates, it'll kill the domestic economy.
Instead of looking to the Fed to save you, then, I recommend you save yourself by investing in real international money. One way to do so is by purchasing silver. Gold is expensive, but silver is still a bargain even for the little guy. When the recession comes, the ripple effect on your financial future will be immeasurable.
Thursday, October 18, 2007
margin of safety
A frequently asked question on value investing and how to calculate intrinsic value is this: how can you be so sure that the co's intrinsic value is this and at this price it is a good investment?
For those not so sure what the hell is going on, read these first
Value Investing
Intrinsic Value
Good Investment
Well, the truth is, you are never sure, you can spend 20 days calculating the intrinsic value of the company and become so sure that the stock is undervalued. So you buy and the stock tank 20%. Shiok huh?Intrinsic value goes hand in hand with margin of safety. Bcos you can never be sure whether you really got the intrinsic value right, you need to have a margin of safety. ie you will only buy the stock if the current price is way, way, WAY below your calculated intrinsic value.
As a rule of thumb, I recommend 40-50% below your calculated intrinsic value.Buffett used the example of building a bridge. If you know that the maximum weight of vehicles that will cross the bridge is 10 tons (based on historical statistics), will you build a bridge that will support 10 tons or a bridge that will support 30 tons?That is margin of safety.
Ben Graham, the grandfather of value investing once said this: if you need to surmise value investing into only 3 words, it would be "margin of safety". It is THAT important.Unfortunately, most investors don't really have this concept in mind. Even those who are very experienced. I guess it's not easy partly bcos have a strict margin of safety rule forces you to pass on many investment ideas even if they are quite good. And when you see them rally 100% after you decided NOT to buy them, wah shiok right?
Now every wall you see has a purpose. For you to bang your head hard on it! Haha!But having a margin of safety will make very sure that you will not lose your shirt. Even if you are damn wrong on your intrinsic value, you may lose a bit of money, the stock may tank 20%, but it won't tank like 80% and chances are after it tank 20% it will creep back up again, it will not bankrupt you. That's the strength if you have a huge margin of safety.
For those not so sure what the hell is going on, read these first
Value Investing
Intrinsic Value
Good Investment
Well, the truth is, you are never sure, you can spend 20 days calculating the intrinsic value of the company and become so sure that the stock is undervalued. So you buy and the stock tank 20%. Shiok huh?Intrinsic value goes hand in hand with margin of safety. Bcos you can never be sure whether you really got the intrinsic value right, you need to have a margin of safety. ie you will only buy the stock if the current price is way, way, WAY below your calculated intrinsic value.
As a rule of thumb, I recommend 40-50% below your calculated intrinsic value.Buffett used the example of building a bridge. If you know that the maximum weight of vehicles that will cross the bridge is 10 tons (based on historical statistics), will you build a bridge that will support 10 tons or a bridge that will support 30 tons?That is margin of safety.
Ben Graham, the grandfather of value investing once said this: if you need to surmise value investing into only 3 words, it would be "margin of safety". It is THAT important.Unfortunately, most investors don't really have this concept in mind. Even those who are very experienced. I guess it's not easy partly bcos have a strict margin of safety rule forces you to pass on many investment ideas even if they are quite good. And when you see them rally 100% after you decided NOT to buy them, wah shiok right?
Now every wall you see has a purpose. For you to bang your head hard on it! Haha!But having a margin of safety will make very sure that you will not lose your shirt. Even if you are damn wrong on your intrinsic value, you may lose a bit of money, the stock may tank 20%, but it won't tank like 80% and chances are after it tank 20% it will creep back up again, it will not bankrupt you. That's the strength if you have a huge margin of safety.
先學睇勢再學揀股
差唔多所有巨大財富，都來自投資初期嘅中小企而漸漸變成大企業者。換言之，非傳統想法才可帶來非傳統利潤，例如蘋果嘅iPod及iPhone。
幽默大師Tom Lehrer被問及點樣成功，佢話係「偷橋」。其實，投資成功嘅道理亦一樣，就係向成功投資者「偷橋」，本港大部分成功投資者便是响房地產趨勢漸明顯時加入（例如1967至74年），然後一直追隨趨勢。可惜呢個大趨勢1997年結束，2003年起嘅趨勢係細屋換大屋（即大單位住宅升幅才會大）。
2003年4月起另一趨勢漸明顯，就係四叔教大家唔好再炒樓，改行去炒股，而且係炒同中國概念有關嘅股份！過去五年四叔來自投資中國概念股嘅利潤早已跑贏房地產。四叔亦唔自私，將呢條橋公開，歡迎大家「偷橋」！
展望未來極度偏高嘅股市出現調整唔奇，但大趨勢如何？中國正步入中產階級大量增加期，一如七十年代至1997年前香港，其中提供嘅商機，真係無限。
先學睇勢再學揀股
英雄，時勢。好多時只係時勢造英雄，例如响上升行業中（1984至97年本港房地產）獲利；只有响行業不景氣時，真英雄才浮現（例如1997至2003 年房地產仍能獲利嘅地產公司）。換言之，既要挑選行業，更要挑選管理良好嘅公司去投資。响行業向上周期，係咪龍頭股並唔重要（因為everything goes）；但响行業不景氣時，優質股同低質股分別可以好大。換言之，投資者先要學睇勢（即行業盛衰）而非睇市（後市點樣）；學曉睇勢後，應學習揀股（stock-picking）。
至於學走勢，我老曹1970年已開始學，至今年已三十七年，可能資質問題，至今仍無法掌握走勢。以波浪理論為例，我老曹 1978年已開始學，至今仍唔了解。不過，連波浪大師Prechter响九十年代亦睇錯市（認為道指3600點見頂），咁我地做徒弟嘅，又點可以睇啱市?!我老曹早喺九十年代已放棄繼續研究波浪理論，自己花咗十二年時間仍未能掌握，唯有棄而不用；
反之，趨勢卻容易好多（例如一浪高於一浪，寧買當頭起，莫買當頭跌），只要該股每一低點仍較前低點高，即趨勢仍未改變。油價最近見88美元，打破去年高位，即大方向仍向上；至於油價能否見100美元一桶？木宰羊（如果見嘅話亦非好事）。近日油價上升理由係擔心土耳其入侵伊拉克產油區，而政治因素從來無法分析。
Good Sentiment Poll指數已見70.9，係2006年1月以來最高；加上恒生指數由8月17日至今升幅唔細，股市已過分樂觀。從油價、金價睇，1970年代式滯脹已在眼前。1970至79年升幅最大係油價同金價，2000年開始到2009年係咪亦一樣？上次金價由1969年起步，响1974年12月出現高潮（200美元），之後回落到1976年103美元，再狂升到1980年1月850美元。2001年起金價會否重演七十年代走勢？
貝南奇講得好清楚：9月份減息半厘目的係阻止美國經濟陷入衰退，但唔會保護貸款者及投資者因自己決定錯誤而受到損傷！最近佢再聲明美國樓價不但第四季仍會回落，明年上半年亦一樣，聯儲局會繼續注意情況，响必要時採取適當措施。
1907年美國政府無法兌現所發行嘅美國政府債券（可兌為黃金），JP摩根聯同美國各大銀行向政府借出2500萬美元黃金，解決當年嘅美元危機，美股迅速上升；1914年JP摩根協助政府組成聯儲局。1998年長期資本管理公司出事，各大銀行及證券商响格蛇協助下，成立36億美元挽救計劃，協助長期資本管理公司度過危機，美股亦從此再升。呢次由花旗、摩根大通、美國銀行聯手組成1000億美元超級基金購入SIV資金（Structured Investment Vehicles），其中大部分係RMBS（次按債券）、CDO（貸款組合）及ABS（汽車貸款、信用卡貸款、物業貸款），上述貸款資金以短期資金為基礎，透過呢個計劃轉為長期貸款，能否解決次按危機？初步市場反應欠佳，三大銀行股價响消息公布後遭拋售，反映金融市場唔睇好上述計劃，因為擔心呢批次按債券負債人嘅未來還錢能力。根據大趨勢，美國樓價由去年8月起回落，以過去例子，好少响兩三年內完成。
我老曹早已一再指出，次按問題仍會糾纏落去直至2009年，但整個經濟則唔受影響。股價波動、美元弱勢、美國房地產繼續回落乃大趨勢，新興市場至今繼續免疫，甚至有D瘋狂。8月20日至今，本港H股簡直係本世紀最佳嘅賺錢之地（七星期內國企指數升70％）！
但須避免沾手：一、同次按有關企業；二、內地汽車製造業；三、所謂納米科技公司；四、健康食品行業。可睇好嘅行業：甲、基建項目；乙、內地電訊股；丙、環保行業；丁、能源行業。
1970年代香港進入繁榮期後出生嘅一代同我地戰後出生嬰兒，最大分別在於退休心態。戰後嬰兒經歷1950、60年代香港貧窮期，視工作為神聖而願為工作放棄很多（例如假期，部分人甚至願意放棄正常家庭生活）。反而1970年代才出生者卻希望四十五歲前退休去享受生活，並希望能夠喺物業市場或股票市場上make a short-term killing，好多人亦因此响1997至2003年陷入負資產陷阱；佢地過分着重休閒，甚至喺工作生涯中亦唔肯為工作而放棄長假福利。
作為戰後出世嬰兒，無權批評繁榮期出生嘅一代，佢地亦不應批評我地呢一代（例如已經咁有錢仲咁努力工作，係愚蠢行為）。總之大家係兩代人，童年因經濟環境不同而心態各異。我地呢一代較重視金錢報酬而甘心放棄閒暇，1970年代出生者更重視閒暇及家庭生活。上述不涉及錯對問題，只係生活態度唔同而已。
西藏蟲草引發全球蟲草熱
追求健康已成為現代人生活嘅一部分。科學家响實驗室利用白老鼠所做實驗得出答案：人類平均壽命應該係一百六十歲，而非八十歲！換言之，今天人類大部分係「中年早逝」，而非「死於老年」，只因生活中有幾大要訣冇遵守：A、三少一多（少油、少鹽、少糖、多做運動，例如每天三十分鐘或步行一小時），最好由三十歲開始。B、Less is more。例如只吃七分飽及每星期少吃一餐，原來短期飢餓可引發身體自我修補器官輕微嘅損傷能力，令自己更強壯。C、身體嘅鈣去錯咗地方。年輕時人體正常吸收鈣去建立強健嘅骨格；三十歲後身體响處理鈣方面唔再如以前般有效率，結果令鈣响血管壁內沉澱，令微絲血管唔再似三十歲前咁暢通（中醫叫氣血運行得唔好），許多毛病由此開始，例如腦部由於無法獲得充足養分供應，記憶力開始走下坡（人類腦活動能力由三十歲開始逐步減慢），視力漸走下坡由四十歲開始（眼睛因無法獲充足養分而走下坡），骨骼因不獲充足養分而失去吸收鈣能力；五十歲開始出現骨質疏鬆現象。如呢段日子仍拚命飲奶，不但無助骨骼吸收，反而令更多鈣去咗唔應該去嘅地方，例如加速血管壁硬化而引發高血壓。過去為咗研究夜盲症，响溫哥華嘅Peter Pang醫生利用中藥理論，向夜盲症病人提供西藏蟲草及從魚油中抽取Omega 3畀病人服用，結果發現夜盲症病人响十天至三十天內情況大大改善。上述引起其他醫藥集團注意而進一步深入研究，結果發現四種草本植物有呢方面功效： fenugreek（印度人用嘅調味劑）；gymnema sylvestre；Konjac mannan（魔芋甘露，主要產自中東一帶）；nopal cactus（胭脂仙人掌，生長喺南美洲一帶）。如將四種草本混合畀血糖偏高嘅人士服用，兩星期或以上可見到血糖明顯下降30％、54％甚至84％（因人而異）；如服用六個月，不但血糖下降，連高血壓、膽固醇、三脂甘油酸亦漸恢復正常；如服用超過六個月，連骨格亦漸漸強壯起來，甚至記憶力改善。到底呢四種植物內會有乜嘢成分，令人體可恢復處理鈣嘅能力，令鈣唔再停留响血管壁而被骨骼吸收掉？依家芝加哥大學正進行深入研究。相信不久將來，將可為人類搵到如何活到一百三十歲而擁有六十歲左右嘅健康狀況。家吓已證實西藏蟲草加魚油中嘅Omega 3長期服用可令血管壁軟化同時強壯骨骼（係咪延年益壽則有待進一步研究）。上述消息令近年西藏蟲草售價狂升十倍，引發全球蟲草熱。
幽默大師Tom Lehrer被問及點樣成功，佢話係「偷橋」。其實，投資成功嘅道理亦一樣，就係向成功投資者「偷橋」，本港大部分成功投資者便是响房地產趨勢漸明顯時加入（例如1967至74年），然後一直追隨趨勢。可惜呢個大趨勢1997年結束，2003年起嘅趨勢係細屋換大屋（即大單位住宅升幅才會大）。
2003年4月起另一趨勢漸明顯，就係四叔教大家唔好再炒樓，改行去炒股，而且係炒同中國概念有關嘅股份！過去五年四叔來自投資中國概念股嘅利潤早已跑贏房地產。四叔亦唔自私，將呢條橋公開，歡迎大家「偷橋」！
展望未來極度偏高嘅股市出現調整唔奇，但大趨勢如何？中國正步入中產階級大量增加期，一如七十年代至1997年前香港，其中提供嘅商機，真係無限。
先學睇勢再學揀股
英雄，時勢。好多時只係時勢造英雄，例如响上升行業中（1984至97年本港房地產）獲利；只有响行業不景氣時，真英雄才浮現（例如1997至2003 年房地產仍能獲利嘅地產公司）。換言之，既要挑選行業，更要挑選管理良好嘅公司去投資。响行業向上周期，係咪龍頭股並唔重要（因為everything goes）；但响行業不景氣時，優質股同低質股分別可以好大。換言之，投資者先要學睇勢（即行業盛衰）而非睇市（後市點樣）；學曉睇勢後，應學習揀股（stock-picking）。
至於學走勢，我老曹1970年已開始學，至今年已三十七年，可能資質問題，至今仍無法掌握走勢。以波浪理論為例，我老曹 1978年已開始學，至今仍唔了解。不過，連波浪大師Prechter响九十年代亦睇錯市（認為道指3600點見頂），咁我地做徒弟嘅，又點可以睇啱市?!我老曹早喺九十年代已放棄繼續研究波浪理論，自己花咗十二年時間仍未能掌握，唯有棄而不用；
反之，趨勢卻容易好多（例如一浪高於一浪，寧買當頭起，莫買當頭跌），只要該股每一低點仍較前低點高，即趨勢仍未改變。油價最近見88美元，打破去年高位，即大方向仍向上；至於油價能否見100美元一桶？木宰羊（如果見嘅話亦非好事）。近日油價上升理由係擔心土耳其入侵伊拉克產油區，而政治因素從來無法分析。
Good Sentiment Poll指數已見70.9，係2006年1月以來最高；加上恒生指數由8月17日至今升幅唔細，股市已過分樂觀。從油價、金價睇，1970年代式滯脹已在眼前。1970至79年升幅最大係油價同金價，2000年開始到2009年係咪亦一樣？上次金價由1969年起步，响1974年12月出現高潮（200美元），之後回落到1976年103美元，再狂升到1980年1月850美元。2001年起金價會否重演七十年代走勢？
貝南奇講得好清楚：9月份減息半厘目的係阻止美國經濟陷入衰退，但唔會保護貸款者及投資者因自己決定錯誤而受到損傷！最近佢再聲明美國樓價不但第四季仍會回落，明年上半年亦一樣，聯儲局會繼續注意情況，响必要時採取適當措施。
1907年美國政府無法兌現所發行嘅美國政府債券（可兌為黃金），JP摩根聯同美國各大銀行向政府借出2500萬美元黃金，解決當年嘅美元危機，美股迅速上升；1914年JP摩根協助政府組成聯儲局。1998年長期資本管理公司出事，各大銀行及證券商响格蛇協助下，成立36億美元挽救計劃，協助長期資本管理公司度過危機，美股亦從此再升。呢次由花旗、摩根大通、美國銀行聯手組成1000億美元超級基金購入SIV資金（Structured Investment Vehicles），其中大部分係RMBS（次按債券）、CDO（貸款組合）及ABS（汽車貸款、信用卡貸款、物業貸款），上述貸款資金以短期資金為基礎，透過呢個計劃轉為長期貸款，能否解決次按危機？初步市場反應欠佳，三大銀行股價响消息公布後遭拋售，反映金融市場唔睇好上述計劃，因為擔心呢批次按債券負債人嘅未來還錢能力。根據大趨勢，美國樓價由去年8月起回落，以過去例子，好少响兩三年內完成。
我老曹早已一再指出，次按問題仍會糾纏落去直至2009年，但整個經濟則唔受影響。股價波動、美元弱勢、美國房地產繼續回落乃大趨勢，新興市場至今繼續免疫，甚至有D瘋狂。8月20日至今，本港H股簡直係本世紀最佳嘅賺錢之地（七星期內國企指數升70％）！
但須避免沾手：一、同次按有關企業；二、內地汽車製造業；三、所謂納米科技公司；四、健康食品行業。可睇好嘅行業：甲、基建項目；乙、內地電訊股；丙、環保行業；丁、能源行業。
1970年代香港進入繁榮期後出生嘅一代同我地戰後出生嬰兒，最大分別在於退休心態。戰後嬰兒經歷1950、60年代香港貧窮期，視工作為神聖而願為工作放棄很多（例如假期，部分人甚至願意放棄正常家庭生活）。反而1970年代才出生者卻希望四十五歲前退休去享受生活，並希望能夠喺物業市場或股票市場上make a short-term killing，好多人亦因此响1997至2003年陷入負資產陷阱；佢地過分着重休閒，甚至喺工作生涯中亦唔肯為工作而放棄長假福利。
作為戰後出世嬰兒，無權批評繁榮期出生嘅一代，佢地亦不應批評我地呢一代（例如已經咁有錢仲咁努力工作，係愚蠢行為）。總之大家係兩代人，童年因經濟環境不同而心態各異。我地呢一代較重視金錢報酬而甘心放棄閒暇，1970年代出生者更重視閒暇及家庭生活。上述不涉及錯對問題，只係生活態度唔同而已。
西藏蟲草引發全球蟲草熱
追求健康已成為現代人生活嘅一部分。科學家响實驗室利用白老鼠所做實驗得出答案：人類平均壽命應該係一百六十歲，而非八十歲！換言之，今天人類大部分係「中年早逝」，而非「死於老年」，只因生活中有幾大要訣冇遵守：A、三少一多（少油、少鹽、少糖、多做運動，例如每天三十分鐘或步行一小時），最好由三十歲開始。B、Less is more。例如只吃七分飽及每星期少吃一餐，原來短期飢餓可引發身體自我修補器官輕微嘅損傷能力，令自己更強壯。C、身體嘅鈣去錯咗地方。年輕時人體正常吸收鈣去建立強健嘅骨格；三十歲後身體响處理鈣方面唔再如以前般有效率，結果令鈣响血管壁內沉澱，令微絲血管唔再似三十歲前咁暢通（中醫叫氣血運行得唔好），許多毛病由此開始，例如腦部由於無法獲得充足養分供應，記憶力開始走下坡（人類腦活動能力由三十歲開始逐步減慢），視力漸走下坡由四十歲開始（眼睛因無法獲充足養分而走下坡），骨骼因不獲充足養分而失去吸收鈣能力；五十歲開始出現骨質疏鬆現象。如呢段日子仍拚命飲奶，不但無助骨骼吸收，反而令更多鈣去咗唔應該去嘅地方，例如加速血管壁硬化而引發高血壓。過去為咗研究夜盲症，响溫哥華嘅Peter Pang醫生利用中藥理論，向夜盲症病人提供西藏蟲草及從魚油中抽取Omega 3畀病人服用，結果發現夜盲症病人响十天至三十天內情況大大改善。上述引起其他醫藥集團注意而進一步深入研究，結果發現四種草本植物有呢方面功效： fenugreek（印度人用嘅調味劑）；gymnema sylvestre；Konjac mannan（魔芋甘露，主要產自中東一帶）；nopal cactus（胭脂仙人掌，生長喺南美洲一帶）。如將四種草本混合畀血糖偏高嘅人士服用，兩星期或以上可見到血糖明顯下降30％、54％甚至84％（因人而異）；如服用六個月，不但血糖下降，連高血壓、膽固醇、三脂甘油酸亦漸恢復正常；如服用超過六個月，連骨格亦漸漸強壯起來，甚至記憶力改善。到底呢四種植物內會有乜嘢成分，令人體可恢復處理鈣嘅能力，令鈣唔再停留响血管壁而被骨骼吸收掉？依家芝加哥大學正進行深入研究。相信不久將來，將可為人類搵到如何活到一百三十歲而擁有六十歲左右嘅健康狀況。家吓已證實西藏蟲草加魚油中嘅Omega 3長期服用可令血管壁軟化同時強壯骨骼（係咪延年益壽則有待進一步研究）。上述消息令近年西藏蟲草售價狂升十倍，引發全球蟲草熱。
Greenspan is the ultimate ‘Mr. Inflation’.
I have never been a fan of Easy Al and firmly believe that he has caused the US economy irreparable damage. He retired only in January 2006, but is already doing his utmost to explain his way out of his blunders that are now a causing a financial nightmare for his successor.
William Greider started his recent article in The Nation as follows: “Alan Greenspan has come back from the tomb of history to correct the record.
He did not make any mistakes in his eighteen-year tenure as Federal Reserve chairman. He did not endorse the regressive Bush tax cuts of 2001 that pumped up the federal deficits and aggravated inequalities. He did not cause the housing bubble that is now in collapse. He did not ignore the stock market bubble that subsequently melted away and cost investors $6 trillion. He did not say the Iraq War is ‘largely about oil’. Check the record. These are all lies.”
My precise sentiments regarding the Greenman were aired last week by Richard Russell, veteran writer of the Dow Theory Letters, when he said: “I finished the Greenspan book. I firmly believe that history will see this little egotistical pip-squeak as one of the premier disasters in US history. In my opinion, Greenspan is the ultimate ‘Mr. Inflation’. Greenspan almost single-handedly set the world on the high-liquidity, super-inflation path, all the while saying or thinking that the Fed was acting ‘as if’ the dollar was still backed by gold.
“What’s so disgusting is that Greenspan traded all his earlier ideals for power and ego. Greenspan never did anything that required real courage. Greenspan was the total political animal. His legacy will decline as the years go by.
“The saddest thing is that Greenspan leaves poor, humble, honest Fed Chief Bernanke in an untenable situation. In a US so dependent on high inflation and massive liquidity, Bernanke has no choice but to ‘inflate or die’. In a normal situation, the US could take a recession and take the correction. Not now – with the US depending so heavily on inflation and massive liquidity, any substantial contraction in the money supply would bring the US economy to its knees.”
William Greider started his recent article in The Nation as follows: “Alan Greenspan has come back from the tomb of history to correct the record.
He did not make any mistakes in his eighteen-year tenure as Federal Reserve chairman. He did not endorse the regressive Bush tax cuts of 2001 that pumped up the federal deficits and aggravated inequalities. He did not cause the housing bubble that is now in collapse. He did not ignore the stock market bubble that subsequently melted away and cost investors $6 trillion. He did not say the Iraq War is ‘largely about oil’. Check the record. These are all lies.”
My precise sentiments regarding the Greenman were aired last week by Richard Russell, veteran writer of the Dow Theory Letters, when he said: “I finished the Greenspan book. I firmly believe that history will see this little egotistical pip-squeak as one of the premier disasters in US history. In my opinion, Greenspan is the ultimate ‘Mr. Inflation’. Greenspan almost single-handedly set the world on the high-liquidity, super-inflation path, all the while saying or thinking that the Fed was acting ‘as if’ the dollar was still backed by gold.
“What’s so disgusting is that Greenspan traded all his earlier ideals for power and ego. Greenspan never did anything that required real courage. Greenspan was the total political animal. His legacy will decline as the years go by.
“The saddest thing is that Greenspan leaves poor, humble, honest Fed Chief Bernanke in an untenable situation. In a US so dependent on high inflation and massive liquidity, Bernanke has no choice but to ‘inflate or die’. In a normal situation, the US could take a recession and take the correction. Not now – with the US depending so heavily on inflation and massive liquidity, any substantial contraction in the money supply would bring the US economy to its knees.”
板斧盡出強弩之末
筆者曾經說過，「牆頭草」港股下跌的機會率僅得四分之一，因為美股升佢升，就算美股跌，內地股市升佢照升，只有美股和內地股齊跌，才可一挫港股之氣燄。
上周五（美股上周四低收，內地股上周五急挫，但收市無法全部收復失地）便是好例子。美股一直有隻無形之手托住，故跌跌吓又來個急彈，無論甚麼壞數據或不利消息，都擋不住其屢闖高峯的決心，背後力量之大，真令人大開眼界。
尚幸筆者看穿依靠兩條腿（樓市和股市）撐住的美國經濟，目前只得一條腿──股市，為免衰收尾，布殊又豈容其跪低？所以筆者曾在不同場合指此君才是真正「股神」！
冠一也曾說過，美股神話不滅，內地股市氣勢如虹，睇淡港股形同自殺。然則，美股假到無倫，內地則炒供求，港股又憑啥炒到咁高？心水清之士必定意會到「三個點一條線」之餘，更有中港「局中局」，不然又怎會出現在中央未落實之前，各路人馬高調唱「港股直通車」？又怎會上演一幕財經「插班生」被立法會議員問到口啞，無法解釋為甚麼港府要突然入市買港交所（388），以及天真到話港交所或與上海證券交易所合作？又怎會明知黃金周抬銀紙落嚟買股票的大都是ii（illegal immigrant，即非法入境者，或曰偷渡客），都要硬着頭皮講成是搶高港股的一股力量？難道這些都是合法的？明知瓣瓣硬來，不是觸礁，便是無法解釋或似是而非，見直通車發生故障，港府又縮手，惟今之計，便是連最後板斧QDII都出埋。
隨着中央連番加息，索水和釋放法人股，相信港股只有四分一機會下跌之謬論，已有修正的必要！
上周五（美股上周四低收，內地股上周五急挫，但收市無法全部收復失地）便是好例子。美股一直有隻無形之手托住，故跌跌吓又來個急彈，無論甚麼壞數據或不利消息，都擋不住其屢闖高峯的決心，背後力量之大，真令人大開眼界。
尚幸筆者看穿依靠兩條腿（樓市和股市）撐住的美國經濟，目前只得一條腿──股市，為免衰收尾，布殊又豈容其跪低？所以筆者曾在不同場合指此君才是真正「股神」！
冠一也曾說過，美股神話不滅，內地股市氣勢如虹，睇淡港股形同自殺。然則，美股假到無倫，內地則炒供求，港股又憑啥炒到咁高？心水清之士必定意會到「三個點一條線」之餘，更有中港「局中局」，不然又怎會出現在中央未落實之前，各路人馬高調唱「港股直通車」？又怎會上演一幕財經「插班生」被立法會議員問到口啞，無法解釋為甚麼港府要突然入市買港交所（388），以及天真到話港交所或與上海證券交易所合作？又怎會明知黃金周抬銀紙落嚟買股票的大都是ii（illegal immigrant，即非法入境者，或曰偷渡客），都要硬着頭皮講成是搶高港股的一股力量？難道這些都是合法的？明知瓣瓣硬來，不是觸礁，便是無法解釋或似是而非，見直通車發生故障，港府又縮手，惟今之計，便是連最後板斧QDII都出埋。
隨着中央連番加息，索水和釋放法人股，相信港股只有四分一機會下跌之謬論，已有修正的必要！
強弩之末不足言勇
美國此地無銀三百両，搞個甚麼「大水喉」基金（M-LEC），以為可以穩定金融市場兼乘機托一托股市，豈料在消息公佈後3個月聯邦債券孳息，由4.18厘飆上4.3厘，6個月孳息則由4.28厘升上4.37厘，認真攞景！
至於股市不但不升，反而大幅滑落。道指前晚一度跌超過180點至13900點邊緣，若不是油價創新高，促使大價股埃克森美孚股價上升1.43%撐住，兼且有隻「無形之手」在美股收市前15分鐘喪掃，道指可能跌過「兩嚿」也不奇。標普500指數最低見1540點，跌22點，納指也曾跌過43點。如斯疲弱走勢，難道投資者認同筆者之想法乎（昨日「裝模作樣，杯水車薪」欄已略述，在此不贅）？
全球最大銀行集團花旗第3季度業績比同賺少57%，僅得23.8億（美元．下同）。去年同期賺55億，如今彈出個3年來最差的盈利數字，仍說符合市場預期，收貨與否，見仁見智。最少股市並不認同。
筆者剛於前日指港股只有四分一機會率下跌，謬論實有修正必要（見10月15日「板斧盡出、強弩之末」欄），因為說時遲那時快，昨日滬深股市上升，港股卻照跌如儀，正是好嘅唔靈醜嘅靈！
港股這兩日走勢有點古靈精怪，前日恒指升702點，先是滙控（005）、中移動（941）、中石化（386）和中海油（883），便貢獻了556點，上升股票375隻，下跌的622隻；昨日恒期開市跌300點後早段收復失地，之後曾上升超過300點，午飯後曾急跌多過700點，收市跌586點，上升股票僅 240隻，下跌者771隻（上午已是這樣），成交高達2000億元。期指前日升市成交5萬多張，昨跌市超過8萬張，低水近200點，可有啓示？
至於股市不但不升，反而大幅滑落。道指前晚一度跌超過180點至13900點邊緣，若不是油價創新高，促使大價股埃克森美孚股價上升1.43%撐住，兼且有隻「無形之手」在美股收市前15分鐘喪掃，道指可能跌過「兩嚿」也不奇。標普500指數最低見1540點，跌22點，納指也曾跌過43點。如斯疲弱走勢，難道投資者認同筆者之想法乎（昨日「裝模作樣，杯水車薪」欄已略述，在此不贅）？
全球最大銀行集團花旗第3季度業績比同賺少57%，僅得23.8億（美元．下同）。去年同期賺55億，如今彈出個3年來最差的盈利數字，仍說符合市場預期，收貨與否，見仁見智。最少股市並不認同。
筆者剛於前日指港股只有四分一機會率下跌，謬論實有修正必要（見10月15日「板斧盡出、強弩之末」欄），因為說時遲那時快，昨日滬深股市上升，港股卻照跌如儀，正是好嘅唔靈醜嘅靈！
港股這兩日走勢有點古靈精怪，前日恒指升702點，先是滙控（005）、中移動（941）、中石化（386）和中海油（883），便貢獻了556點，上升股票375隻，下跌的622隻；昨日恒期開市跌300點後早段收復失地，之後曾上升超過300點，午飯後曾急跌多過700點，收市跌586點，上升股票僅 240隻，下跌者771隻（上午已是這樣），成交高達2000億元。期指前日升市成交5萬多張，昨跌市超過8萬張，低水近200點，可有啓示？
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
寬鬆貨幣係泡沫根源
10月16日，周二。恒生指數跌586.23，收28954.55；成交2008.33億元。10月期指跌754點，收28771點。恒指見 30000點後係咪後勁不繼？
天津市長戴相龍證實，中央政府將押後實施8月20日允許國內部分居民投資港股嘅計劃，因為試點方案錯綜複雜。
美月底減息機會降
美國樓市下挫對經濟仲係一項隱憂，影響一直延續到明年。貝南奇話美國物業對經濟係一個拖累，但美元1.4205兌1歐羅，油價則升穿86美元一桶，响咁環境下，10月31日減息機會卻已下降。
日本8月份房屋新建築合約減少43.3％（7月份減少23.4％），理由係6月20日起政府要求新建房屋可抗地震，上述新系統需七十天測試（過去二十一天），令新建築房屋合約由6月份上升6％變成7月起下跌（唔少合約趕及6月20日前申請）。影響之下，雷曼兄弟將今年日本GDP增長率由2％降至 1.9％，政府正留意呢個係短期或長期情況，令人擔心明年日本經濟又陷衰退。日圓又回升，日經平均指數再回落，令澳元從二十三年高價回落。擔心日圓利差交易再出現unwind。
8月17日開始嘅上升潮，至今肯定已超買，短期出現調整正常過正常；不過，响美元弱勢未改變前，後市方向相信係反覆向上。
唔好同趨勢作對
恒生指數平均O响二十二倍以上，早已進入極高水平，但唔好同趨勢作對（Don't fight the trend），冇人事前知道邊個水平才係群眾極度樂觀，通常樂觀比率達70％，方向才出現改變（上周五美國係66％，代表後市仍有上升空間）。從前美元由低潮回升如1973、87、93年，都對股市造成傷害。呢次美元响2002年年初開始回落，何時見底？無法事先估計，唔排除响今年第四季尋底。價值投資者可能失去ride this cycle嘅機會而被left behind！8月17日至今嘅資源股及中字派股份，上升到最後一期都有瘋狂現象出現，1997年紅籌股熱潮係咁，2000年科網股係咁，依家資源股同中字派股份亦係咁。當最後嘅閒人都衝入市場去吸納高風險資產時，呢段日子先至係最易賺錢嘅日子。至於點樣响別人頭腦發熱時自己保持冷靜？講就易，做到卻難。圖表或可提供一定幫助。
中國經濟正進入最高工作人口百分比期，直到2020年（1979年開始一孩政策嘅結果）。唔單止咁，中國工作人口質素亦較1980至90年代改善。 1980至90年代，中國勞動主力係工人；踏入2000年代，中國提供嘅工作人口係已接受教育嘅新世代，佢地從事IT工作、管理層、基建項目，而非只能出賣廉價勞動力者。今年人民幣只升4％，印度盧比上升12％，上述亦係中國經濟過熱嘅部分理由。
中國經濟自2001年起進入小康局面至今，中國應該仲有十二年以上經濟繁榮期。中東則隨着油價急升而進入高收入期，大量外滙盈餘到處搵出路。反而日本步入老年期，美國經濟高峰期亦過去（低儲蓄率影響力漸浮現）。由於中國有外滙管制，中國人每年只可購入5萬美元外幣，上述外幣相信大部分用作炒賣香港股票之用，支持住今年恒生指數表現。
1980至2001年，中國因素令美國享受咗二十一年低通脹期，可隨時減息而毋須擔心通脹率上升嘅問題；2001年後完全唔同，因為中國本身嘅資源已無法應付巨大出口需求，有賴入口原材料才能支持出口增長率，令2001年起呢次美國減息潮刺激金價升上762美元，即使過去八年各國央行不斷拋售黃金。金價第一目標價750美元已打破，第二目標價830美元在望，最終目標價應係1050美元。1980年代開始嘅地球村理論，令國際間加強經濟合作，全球 GDP增長率加快，通訊事業發達，國與國之間加強彼此了解，透過分散風險，帶來1982年至今全球一次最長嘅經濟繁榮期（個別國家仍有衰退，但全球一直保持繁榮）。上述繁榮期到二十一世紀亦造成全球資源緊張，利淡因素開始浮現。响地球村理論下，中國全力開拓美國市場，1990年代令日本同德國產品世界競爭優勢漸失，造成今天中美貿易不平衡。下一步應該係世界資源重新分配（例如美國人無理由再佔用全球咁大量資源）。
油價進一步上升影響運油輪生意；反之，煤、鐵礦石及其他原材料需求，繼續推高乾貨輪租金。大量新乾貨輪下水係2010到2011年嘅事，但係估計乾貨輪租金响今年第四季見頂。
貨幣學派佛利民曾講過，貨幣政策嘅局限性就係响固定滙價下，無法固定利率及控制失業率（呢方面香港政府已證明上述理論正確。1983年11月至今嘅聯滙制度下，將港元同美元滙價固定，結果卻令港元利率及失業率大幅波動）。1971年9月美國放棄固定利率後，加強政府對利率及失業率嘅影響力，但最終卻引發信用泛濫，演變成今年嘅次按危機，令房地產價格回落及經濟受到拖累。房屋及金融服務佔美國GDP增長嘅40％，呢方面影響漸漸浮現。流動性（Liquidity）並非代表一大堆資金，而係代表投資者心態。如投資者願承擔較大風險及銀行願意提供寬鬆借貸政策，便可產生流動性；即使大量資金存在，亦唔會產生流動性。換言之，流動性出現係經濟上一種行為或心態，例如1990年香港政府嘅負利率政策下（利率低於CPI增長率），引發香港流動性。而內地股改到2005年下半年，亦引發流動性，情況有如堆滿積雪嘅雪山可以長期靜止，一旦引發雪崩又有如萬馬奔騰，而每次引發雪崩理由唔同，出現雪崩與否又同積雪多少無關。
資產價格形成趨勢難阻止
凱恩斯亦有描述呢個現象。喺1936年出版嘅The General Theory指出：資產價格（尤其係股票）一旦形成趨勢便不易阻止，例如出現向上趨勢而同時出現信貸寬鬆政策，便可產生流動性；股票價格一再向上，便產生股價重估，為投機者提供炒賣機會。响早上10時或11時出售後，下午又考慮重新返回市場……。股票迅速轉手，漸漸股價同公司業績資產無關，只受流動性所推動，直至去到一個極端。上述情況出現，心理因素大於真實價格預期，再唔受O、息率等掣肘，因為投機者只着重一天、一星期最多一個月內嘅利潤，而唔會理會該公司中長線因素，令傳統評估方法失效。個別投機者受當時嘅意見、主張所引導，再由樂觀情緒或悲觀情緒所主宰，直到有一天泡沫爆破為止。
凱恩斯嘅忠告係：寬鬆貨幣政策係引發泡沫嘅根源，泡沫最後結果往往係崩潰收場。描述十分精彩！
天津市長戴相龍證實，中央政府將押後實施8月20日允許國內部分居民投資港股嘅計劃，因為試點方案錯綜複雜。
美月底減息機會降
美國樓市下挫對經濟仲係一項隱憂，影響一直延續到明年。貝南奇話美國物業對經濟係一個拖累，但美元1.4205兌1歐羅，油價則升穿86美元一桶，响咁環境下，10月31日減息機會卻已下降。
日本8月份房屋新建築合約減少43.3％（7月份減少23.4％），理由係6月20日起政府要求新建房屋可抗地震，上述新系統需七十天測試（過去二十一天），令新建築房屋合約由6月份上升6％變成7月起下跌（唔少合約趕及6月20日前申請）。影響之下，雷曼兄弟將今年日本GDP增長率由2％降至 1.9％，政府正留意呢個係短期或長期情況，令人擔心明年日本經濟又陷衰退。日圓又回升，日經平均指數再回落，令澳元從二十三年高價回落。擔心日圓利差交易再出現unwind。
8月17日開始嘅上升潮，至今肯定已超買，短期出現調整正常過正常；不過，响美元弱勢未改變前，後市方向相信係反覆向上。
唔好同趨勢作對
恒生指數平均O响二十二倍以上，早已進入極高水平，但唔好同趨勢作對（Don't fight the trend），冇人事前知道邊個水平才係群眾極度樂觀，通常樂觀比率達70％，方向才出現改變（上周五美國係66％，代表後市仍有上升空間）。從前美元由低潮回升如1973、87、93年，都對股市造成傷害。呢次美元响2002年年初開始回落，何時見底？無法事先估計，唔排除响今年第四季尋底。價值投資者可能失去ride this cycle嘅機會而被left behind！8月17日至今嘅資源股及中字派股份，上升到最後一期都有瘋狂現象出現，1997年紅籌股熱潮係咁，2000年科網股係咁，依家資源股同中字派股份亦係咁。當最後嘅閒人都衝入市場去吸納高風險資產時，呢段日子先至係最易賺錢嘅日子。至於點樣响別人頭腦發熱時自己保持冷靜？講就易，做到卻難。圖表或可提供一定幫助。
中國經濟正進入最高工作人口百分比期，直到2020年（1979年開始一孩政策嘅結果）。唔單止咁，中國工作人口質素亦較1980至90年代改善。 1980至90年代，中國勞動主力係工人；踏入2000年代，中國提供嘅工作人口係已接受教育嘅新世代，佢地從事IT工作、管理層、基建項目，而非只能出賣廉價勞動力者。今年人民幣只升4％，印度盧比上升12％，上述亦係中國經濟過熱嘅部分理由。
中國經濟自2001年起進入小康局面至今，中國應該仲有十二年以上經濟繁榮期。中東則隨着油價急升而進入高收入期，大量外滙盈餘到處搵出路。反而日本步入老年期，美國經濟高峰期亦過去（低儲蓄率影響力漸浮現）。由於中國有外滙管制，中國人每年只可購入5萬美元外幣，上述外幣相信大部分用作炒賣香港股票之用，支持住今年恒生指數表現。
1980至2001年，中國因素令美國享受咗二十一年低通脹期，可隨時減息而毋須擔心通脹率上升嘅問題；2001年後完全唔同，因為中國本身嘅資源已無法應付巨大出口需求，有賴入口原材料才能支持出口增長率，令2001年起呢次美國減息潮刺激金價升上762美元，即使過去八年各國央行不斷拋售黃金。金價第一目標價750美元已打破，第二目標價830美元在望，最終目標價應係1050美元。1980年代開始嘅地球村理論，令國際間加強經濟合作，全球 GDP增長率加快，通訊事業發達，國與國之間加強彼此了解，透過分散風險，帶來1982年至今全球一次最長嘅經濟繁榮期（個別國家仍有衰退，但全球一直保持繁榮）。上述繁榮期到二十一世紀亦造成全球資源緊張，利淡因素開始浮現。响地球村理論下，中國全力開拓美國市場，1990年代令日本同德國產品世界競爭優勢漸失，造成今天中美貿易不平衡。下一步應該係世界資源重新分配（例如美國人無理由再佔用全球咁大量資源）。
油價進一步上升影響運油輪生意；反之，煤、鐵礦石及其他原材料需求，繼續推高乾貨輪租金。大量新乾貨輪下水係2010到2011年嘅事，但係估計乾貨輪租金响今年第四季見頂。
貨幣學派佛利民曾講過，貨幣政策嘅局限性就係响固定滙價下，無法固定利率及控制失業率（呢方面香港政府已證明上述理論正確。1983年11月至今嘅聯滙制度下，將港元同美元滙價固定，結果卻令港元利率及失業率大幅波動）。1971年9月美國放棄固定利率後，加強政府對利率及失業率嘅影響力，但最終卻引發信用泛濫，演變成今年嘅次按危機，令房地產價格回落及經濟受到拖累。房屋及金融服務佔美國GDP增長嘅40％，呢方面影響漸漸浮現。流動性（Liquidity）並非代表一大堆資金，而係代表投資者心態。如投資者願承擔較大風險及銀行願意提供寬鬆借貸政策，便可產生流動性；即使大量資金存在，亦唔會產生流動性。換言之，流動性出現係經濟上一種行為或心態，例如1990年香港政府嘅負利率政策下（利率低於CPI增長率），引發香港流動性。而內地股改到2005年下半年，亦引發流動性，情況有如堆滿積雪嘅雪山可以長期靜止，一旦引發雪崩又有如萬馬奔騰，而每次引發雪崩理由唔同，出現雪崩與否又同積雪多少無關。
資產價格形成趨勢難阻止
凱恩斯亦有描述呢個現象。喺1936年出版嘅The General Theory指出：資產價格（尤其係股票）一旦形成趨勢便不易阻止，例如出現向上趨勢而同時出現信貸寬鬆政策，便可產生流動性；股票價格一再向上，便產生股價重估，為投機者提供炒賣機會。响早上10時或11時出售後，下午又考慮重新返回市場……。股票迅速轉手，漸漸股價同公司業績資產無關，只受流動性所推動，直至去到一個極端。上述情況出現，心理因素大於真實價格預期，再唔受O、息率等掣肘，因為投機者只着重一天、一星期最多一個月內嘅利潤，而唔會理會該公司中長線因素，令傳統評估方法失效。個別投機者受當時嘅意見、主張所引導，再由樂觀情緒或悲觀情緒所主宰，直到有一天泡沫爆破為止。
凱恩斯嘅忠告係：寬鬆貨幣政策係引發泡沫嘅根源，泡沫最後結果往往係崩潰收場。描述十分精彩！
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
炒輪三招
近排身邊多咗人炒輪，原因係好多散戶嫌買正股成本高，所以走去買窩輪，諗住以小博大。先排同個基金經理朋友傾開窩輪嘅問題，佢話有個客用100萬銀嚟投資，其中10萬銀用嚟炒輪，佔個portfolio一成，其餘九成就用嚟買正股。結果半年時間，10萬變30萬。
窩輪都可以炒業績
敏妮之前都叫人買輪，因為當你持有嘅股票已經升到高位，你覺得佢再升嘅機會係五五波，最啱就係take profit之後，將贏番嚟嘅一部份小注買輪，刀仔鋸大樹又好，用少少本錢捕捉剩餘嘅升浪又好。不過，敏妮最大弱點係唔識揀輪，每日中午睇電視都會見到位男士，喺鏡頭面前用急口令方式推介一隻輪，但敏妮成日覺得冇理由聽嗰幾分鐘就落投資決定，何況嗰位男士講免責聲明嘅時間仲多個介紹嗰隻輪！所以就問呢個朋友，「你個客點炒輪？」原來炒業績除咗可以應用喺正股，仲可以用喺窩輪度，就好似前一陣子，思捷（330）公佈業績，佢個客就喺公佈前一個禮拜買思捷嘅窩輪。另外，就係專搵創新高嘅股票，炒相關嘅輪。咁即係高追？朋友講，「通常一隻股創完新高之後，都會稍為回吐，就喺呢個時候買相關嘅窩輪。」以往炒股係趁高位沽貨，但家個市係炒momentum，創完新高反而有投資者追入，帶動隻窩輪升。
平衡風險唔好瞓身
「通常有番咁上下嘅正股，都有無數咁多隻窩輪，敏妮點知應該揀邊隻？」朋友話佢通常會揀街貨多嘅輪，「街貨多，個價冇咁易俾人舞嚟舞去。仲有，發行商有機會為咗收番啲街貨，將個價推高。」窩輪係用嚟平衡風險嘅工具，敏妮覺得真係想將窩輪當平啲嘅正股炒，唔係唔得，但要好好控制風險同埋睇住自己個投資組合。
窩輪都可以炒業績
敏妮之前都叫人買輪，因為當你持有嘅股票已經升到高位，你覺得佢再升嘅機會係五五波，最啱就係take profit之後，將贏番嚟嘅一部份小注買輪，刀仔鋸大樹又好，用少少本錢捕捉剩餘嘅升浪又好。不過，敏妮最大弱點係唔識揀輪，每日中午睇電視都會見到位男士，喺鏡頭面前用急口令方式推介一隻輪，但敏妮成日覺得冇理由聽嗰幾分鐘就落投資決定，何況嗰位男士講免責聲明嘅時間仲多個介紹嗰隻輪！所以就問呢個朋友，「你個客點炒輪？」原來炒業績除咗可以應用喺正股，仲可以用喺窩輪度，就好似前一陣子，思捷（330）公佈業績，佢個客就喺公佈前一個禮拜買思捷嘅窩輪。另外，就係專搵創新高嘅股票，炒相關嘅輪。咁即係高追？朋友講，「通常一隻股創完新高之後，都會稍為回吐，就喺呢個時候買相關嘅窩輪。」以往炒股係趁高位沽貨，但家個市係炒momentum，創完新高反而有投資者追入，帶動隻窩輪升。
平衡風險唔好瞓身
「通常有番咁上下嘅正股，都有無數咁多隻窩輪，敏妮點知應該揀邊隻？」朋友話佢通常會揀街貨多嘅輪，「街貨多，個價冇咁易俾人舞嚟舞去。仲有，發行商有機會為咗收番啲街貨，將個價推高。」窩輪係用嚟平衡風險嘅工具，敏妮覺得真係想將窩輪當平啲嘅正股炒，唔係唔得，但要好好控制風險同埋睇住自己個投資組合。
怎可能不是泡沫
自己還是死牛一邊頸，不太認同部份言論，最新的差異，在於股市未有泡沫條件論。論者的重心，在於信貸未膨脹，但現在和97年已大大不同，近10年間金融產品飛躍大發展，傳統銀行借貸已並非太重要。最簡單莫如窩輪，玩家不借股票行孖展，卻變相向投資銀行借了錢，來作槓桿式投資，以窩輪成交幾百億一日計，牽涉的槓桿式借貸已是幾千億。是否存在泡沫，應看公司的基本因素，股市有循環，並不是單單投資者欠缺防守力，被迫斬纜所致，而是社會盲目重複投資，令回報未能追上預期，更甚是來到後期，被迫篤數來滿足投資界的意願，在美股有不少類似案例，日後在中國一定也有.
社會欠缺實業
另外，人的質素也有轉變，年輕精英會傾側向金融。金融業只是社會發展中的催化劑，而不是實業，社會欠缺實業支撐，金融業再旺也沒有用。一位朋友的同學，北上國內醫院實習，看見醫生月薪幾千元，樓價就幾十萬元起，惟有個個炒股票。預計前輩遲早心理不平衡之下，會辭職做炒股御宅族。以這樣的國家收入及物價機制，遇上這樣的股市，人人瘋狂是理所當然，怎會不是泡沫。
最近喜歡一隻三四線，唯一是人家寫到明樽頸會是人才，原本中國最不缺的就是人，可是看來中國最多原來只是股民，而不是工程師。剛剛和另一家上市公司的老闆談起這個問題，他也遇到相同的困擾，看來前景也要打一點折扣才合理，年輕讀者講人棄我取，選修工程。不過人才難求以及社會重複建設等問題，並非股市分析員的焦點，大家的視野都放得太短，而人的因素從來亦不可以量化，不可以搬入數學模型，所以由人衍生的問題，會很遲才反映在股價之上，牛市有排未爆，絕對可以，只是在吹水層次上，不接受股市不是泡沫。
社會欠缺實業
另外，人的質素也有轉變，年輕精英會傾側向金融。金融業只是社會發展中的催化劑，而不是實業，社會欠缺實業支撐，金融業再旺也沒有用。一位朋友的同學，北上國內醫院實習，看見醫生月薪幾千元，樓價就幾十萬元起，惟有個個炒股票。預計前輩遲早心理不平衡之下，會辭職做炒股御宅族。以這樣的國家收入及物價機制，遇上這樣的股市，人人瘋狂是理所當然，怎會不是泡沫。
最近喜歡一隻三四線，唯一是人家寫到明樽頸會是人才，原本中國最不缺的就是人，可是看來中國最多原來只是股民，而不是工程師。剛剛和另一家上市公司的老闆談起這個問題，他也遇到相同的困擾，看來前景也要打一點折扣才合理，年輕讀者講人棄我取，選修工程。不過人才難求以及社會重複建設等問題，並非股市分析員的焦點，大家的視野都放得太短，而人的因素從來亦不可以量化，不可以搬入數學模型，所以由人衍生的問題，會很遲才反映在股價之上，牛市有排未爆，絕對可以，只是在吹水層次上，不接受股市不是泡沫。
Profit mirages
IF THERE is a $64,000 (or rather $64 billion) question facing stockmarkets, it is what will happen to corporate profits. A key component of the bullish case is that valuations (in terms of price-earnings ratios) are reasonable; stock market bubbles tend to occur when such ratios reach well above 20, whereas today they are in the mid-teens.
The bearish side would argue that we have witnessed a profits bubble rather than a valuation bubble. American profits are close to a 40-year high as a proportion of national output. If share prices are valued using a 10-year average of profits, then they look very expensive indeed by historical standards.
And it is not just American companies that have been doing well. According to HSBC, the latest set of data on British companies show that, in 2006, profitability (as measured by return on capital employed) reached its highest level since records began in 1965.
The conventional explanation for the surge in profits is related to globalisation. The integration of the Chinese and Indian economies into the global economy has added substantially to the workforce, reducing wage pressures. At the same time, developed-world economies have become more dependent on services than manufacturing; in the former, profitability tends to be both higher and less cyclical.
But there may also have been other factors at work. Goldman Sachs, in a recent note titled "Profits under Pressure", calculates that two sectors, distribution and financials, have done particularly well. Both have benefited from the extensive use of technology to improve productivity while avoiding the splurge of capital investment that hit the telecoms and internet sectors in the late 1990s.
But this does mean that the profits picture is a little unbalanced. Around a third of the profits growth in the last ten years has come from the financial sector, according to Longview Economics. Over the last five years, a good deal of impetus has come from the energy sector, with Lombard Street Research calculating it was responsible for 23% of profits growth over the 2001-06 period. Otherwise, business is not enjoying that much of a boom. Goldman remarks that "margins in many non-financial industries remain at historically unremarkable levels".
Apart from the sector effects, there has also been a boost to earnings per share (EPS) from share buy-backs. Lombard Street Research says this factor was responsible for 7.2% of EPS growth in 2005 and 10.7% in 2006; it cites Thomson Financial as expecting that a fifth of all EPS growth this year will come from buy-backs. This has reflected the relative cheapness of debt compared with equities and cannot continue forever, not least because it would imply the quoted stockmarket disappearing altogether.
Similar arguments could be made for the energy and financial sectors. Oil has marched from $20 a barrel to $80 a barrel in recent years; that pace cannot continue (but if it did, profits in the rest of the economy would surely suffer). Similarly, while the financial sector has benefited from technology, it has also been boosted by rising asset prices and credit growth; the latter, in particular, looks under threat.
And then there is the slowing economy. America may escape recession, but it is definitely suffering a slow patch. The effect on profits has so far been disguised by the weakness of the dollar. But to the extent that allows American companies to gain market share (or has a translation effect on the profits of overseas subsidiaries), companies from other nations must be suffering.
As Goldman points out, analysts’ forecasts of 12% profits growth next year do not seem credible. Indeed, they may not grow at all. As the graph shows, the gap between the profits reported by companies and those calculated in the national accounts figures is wide, just like it was in the late 1990s. And look what happened after that.
The bearish side would argue that we have witnessed a profits bubble rather than a valuation bubble. American profits are close to a 40-year high as a proportion of national output. If share prices are valued using a 10-year average of profits, then they look very expensive indeed by historical standards.
And it is not just American companies that have been doing well. According to HSBC, the latest set of data on British companies show that, in 2006, profitability (as measured by return on capital employed) reached its highest level since records began in 1965.
The conventional explanation for the surge in profits is related to globalisation. The integration of the Chinese and Indian economies into the global economy has added substantially to the workforce, reducing wage pressures. At the same time, developed-world economies have become more dependent on services than manufacturing; in the former, profitability tends to be both higher and less cyclical.
But there may also have been other factors at work. Goldman Sachs, in a recent note titled "Profits under Pressure", calculates that two sectors, distribution and financials, have done particularly well. Both have benefited from the extensive use of technology to improve productivity while avoiding the splurge of capital investment that hit the telecoms and internet sectors in the late 1990s.
But this does mean that the profits picture is a little unbalanced. Around a third of the profits growth in the last ten years has come from the financial sector, according to Longview Economics. Over the last five years, a good deal of impetus has come from the energy sector, with Lombard Street Research calculating it was responsible for 23% of profits growth over the 2001-06 period. Otherwise, business is not enjoying that much of a boom. Goldman remarks that "margins in many non-financial industries remain at historically unremarkable levels".
Apart from the sector effects, there has also been a boost to earnings per share (EPS) from share buy-backs. Lombard Street Research says this factor was responsible for 7.2% of EPS growth in 2005 and 10.7% in 2006; it cites Thomson Financial as expecting that a fifth of all EPS growth this year will come from buy-backs. This has reflected the relative cheapness of debt compared with equities and cannot continue forever, not least because it would imply the quoted stockmarket disappearing altogether.
Similar arguments could be made for the energy and financial sectors. Oil has marched from $20 a barrel to $80 a barrel in recent years; that pace cannot continue (but if it did, profits in the rest of the economy would surely suffer). Similarly, while the financial sector has benefited from technology, it has also been boosted by rising asset prices and credit growth; the latter, in particular, looks under threat.
And then there is the slowing economy. America may escape recession, but it is definitely suffering a slow patch. The effect on profits has so far been disguised by the weakness of the dollar. But to the extent that allows American companies to gain market share (or has a translation effect on the profits of overseas subsidiaries), companies from other nations must be suffering.
As Goldman points out, analysts’ forecasts of 12% profits growth next year do not seem credible. Indeed, they may not grow at all. As the graph shows, the gap between the profits reported by companies and those calculated in the national accounts figures is wide, just like it was in the late 1990s. And look what happened after that.
Monsters in the Closet
In the latter part of the 19th Century, mathematical innovation had become a source of scandals that shook the scientific world and beyond.
Top theoreticians such as Giuseppe Peano and Georg Cantor were producing "monsters," mathematical objects that defied common sense, such as an infinite space-filling curve and mind-boggling logical paradoxes, such as the nonexistence of the set of all sets. Monsters were proliferating, threatening the confidence scientists had in mathematics.
The current crisis in the financial markets has some features in common with this episode. Complex structured finance products, like securitized subprime mortgages or credit derivatives, are the "monsters" of today. Just as some scientists doubted the very foundation of their disciplines then, some bankers today have lost trust in their peers and even in the markets. Just as mathematicians called for "clarification," policymakers and investors are calling for "transparency."
The crisis is serious.
Ten weeks after liquidity dried up in some U.S. and European financial markets, we are not seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. Banks do not trust their peers, suspecting each other of carrying too many risky assets in their books. Consequently, banks pass their higher funding costs and risks on to their customers, either by making credit more expensive, or by becoming more selective. And that matters for the real economy: in the euro area, for instance, 75 percent of the corporate debt issued since 1997 is made of good old bank loans. Hence, the financial crisis is forcing banks to tighten credit conditions, which in turn will have an impact on the real economy and, possibly, on jobs.
This particular crisis is yet another chapter of the secular battle between innovation and regulation. Banking debacles in the 19th century and during the Great Depression resulted in strict regulation. More recently, the financial markets were thoroughly deregulated following Margaret Thatcher's "big bang." The result was a huge variety of new financial theories and products, including (most recently) things like credit derivatives or synthetic asset-backed securities. These products have, in general, helped allocate risk and resources more efficiently.
However, there were two catches.
First, the very complexity of the new products created a wide knowledge gap between producers and buyers. Too many managers bought products they did not fully understand. Too many sellers were not able to translate the risks hidden in obscure financial equations into simple words. Innovation has advanced faster than the expertise of financial officers, ratings agencies and even regulators, as the failure of two German banks has shown. This knowledge mismatch will correct itself and does not call for regulation: excessively complex financial products will wane for lack of appetite.
The second catch is more worrying. The meltdown of the U.S. subprime-mortgage market has unveiled an uncomfortable truth about asset-backed securities: they were not correctly priced, because the data used to estimate probabilities of default could not go back far enough in the past to encompass several periods of crisis similar to today's subprime problems. Downgrading the value of their risky assets from what models indicated they should be, to the more sober numbers that real buyers and sellers are paying, will be a long and painful process, because it will require more defaults to estimate the fair price of risks. This could be politically unpalatable.
There is no doubt that more transparency in banking would be good, more realistic pricing would be sane, and that more competition between credit agencies would help. This is, broadly speaking, what EU Finance ministers have just agreed to push forward as part of a road map for financial stability. However, their pledge to "look closely at nonregulated debt markets" hints that they are tempted to use the regulatory stick to replace over-the-counter, tailor-made financial instruments with securities traded in regulated exchanges. That could dramatically reduce the flexibility and the variety of financial products that companies are currently using to hedge risks. Such a heavy-handed reaction would be counterproductive: in free-market economies, nothing may stop innovation, but overregulation may push it to hide in dark corners and shady firms.
Imagine what would have happened if, in 1900, politicians had decided to ban mathematical monsters and regulate the production of theorems, for fear of further scandals. Of course, such nonsense did not happen. Instead, it took several years of self-discipline and hard work to clearly define and tame the monsters and restore trust in mathematics. The key word here is self-discipline. One can only hope that the financial industry will show enough of it to lighten the hand of policymakers.
Top theoreticians such as Giuseppe Peano and Georg Cantor were producing "monsters," mathematical objects that defied common sense, such as an infinite space-filling curve and mind-boggling logical paradoxes, such as the nonexistence of the set of all sets. Monsters were proliferating, threatening the confidence scientists had in mathematics.
The current crisis in the financial markets has some features in common with this episode. Complex structured finance products, like securitized subprime mortgages or credit derivatives, are the "monsters" of today. Just as some scientists doubted the very foundation of their disciplines then, some bankers today have lost trust in their peers and even in the markets. Just as mathematicians called for "clarification," policymakers and investors are calling for "transparency."
The crisis is serious.
Ten weeks after liquidity dried up in some U.S. and European financial markets, we are not seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. Banks do not trust their peers, suspecting each other of carrying too many risky assets in their books. Consequently, banks pass their higher funding costs and risks on to their customers, either by making credit more expensive, or by becoming more selective. And that matters for the real economy: in the euro area, for instance, 75 percent of the corporate debt issued since 1997 is made of good old bank loans. Hence, the financial crisis is forcing banks to tighten credit conditions, which in turn will have an impact on the real economy and, possibly, on jobs.
This particular crisis is yet another chapter of the secular battle between innovation and regulation. Banking debacles in the 19th century and during the Great Depression resulted in strict regulation. More recently, the financial markets were thoroughly deregulated following Margaret Thatcher's "big bang." The result was a huge variety of new financial theories and products, including (most recently) things like credit derivatives or synthetic asset-backed securities. These products have, in general, helped allocate risk and resources more efficiently.
However, there were two catches.
First, the very complexity of the new products created a wide knowledge gap between producers and buyers. Too many managers bought products they did not fully understand. Too many sellers were not able to translate the risks hidden in obscure financial equations into simple words. Innovation has advanced faster than the expertise of financial officers, ratings agencies and even regulators, as the failure of two German banks has shown. This knowledge mismatch will correct itself and does not call for regulation: excessively complex financial products will wane for lack of appetite.
The second catch is more worrying. The meltdown of the U.S. subprime-mortgage market has unveiled an uncomfortable truth about asset-backed securities: they were not correctly priced, because the data used to estimate probabilities of default could not go back far enough in the past to encompass several periods of crisis similar to today's subprime problems. Downgrading the value of their risky assets from what models indicated they should be, to the more sober numbers that real buyers and sellers are paying, will be a long and painful process, because it will require more defaults to estimate the fair price of risks. This could be politically unpalatable.
There is no doubt that more transparency in banking would be good, more realistic pricing would be sane, and that more competition between credit agencies would help. This is, broadly speaking, what EU Finance ministers have just agreed to push forward as part of a road map for financial stability. However, their pledge to "look closely at nonregulated debt markets" hints that they are tempted to use the regulatory stick to replace over-the-counter, tailor-made financial instruments with securities traded in regulated exchanges. That could dramatically reduce the flexibility and the variety of financial products that companies are currently using to hedge risks. Such a heavy-handed reaction would be counterproductive: in free-market economies, nothing may stop innovation, but overregulation may push it to hide in dark corners and shady firms.
Imagine what would have happened if, in 1900, politicians had decided to ban mathematical monsters and regulate the production of theorems, for fear of further scandals. Of course, such nonsense did not happen. Instead, it took several years of self-discipline and hard work to clearly define and tame the monsters and restore trust in mathematics. The key word here is self-discipline. One can only hope that the financial industry will show enough of it to lighten the hand of policymakers.
Saturday, October 13, 2007
规避股市风险
我国沪深股市第一代职业操盘手、在股市摸爬滚打17年的花荣先生说，许多人是在凭运气或是像赌博一样在炒股，这些人一次两次可以获得一些收益，但不是长久之计。
三大绝招坐稳赢家
花荣先生说，股市最普遍的操作方法有两个，一种是机构投资者和经济学家等一些大客户常用的基本面投资技术，也就是价值分析法，还有一种是中小投资者、中介信用机构常用的技术分析法。在此基础上还有其他的方法可以灵活运用到股市中，就是他的三大绝招，盲点套利、主题投资和底牌投机。
1、盲点套利指的是在容易被忽视、又是关键点的地方投资，以达到预期的盈利。盲点套利具有获得利润稳健、预期并且低风险的特点，在熊市的时候获得盈利，在牛市的时候获得暴利。
2、主题投资讲求阶段性，需要和当时股市的客观环境符合。主题投资要注意证券市场当时的关键点或是某个上市公司、某支股票的关键和主题。
3、底牌投机要注重股票受到重大社会事件的支持，或是了解可能使得股票上涨的一些因素，以此来判断股票可能上涨的空间。花荣先生说，掌握这三种方法，股市许多可能的风险将会规避，并可以保证长期收益。
证券市场到了自变期。我国股市市盈率已经达到60倍，根据其他国家的经验，市盈率突破60倍势必给股市带来一定的振荡，由此推断第四季度是股市的一个临界点，是股市新老转换的阶段。在这个阶段，蓝筹股的概念将会发生变化，不再是以往人们普遍认为的工商银行、中国联通等，可能会转向中国移动、中国石油等新的蓝筹股，这类蓝筹股权证更大、业绩更好，代表了中国股票的大趋势。蓝筹股概念的变化，以及将推迟推出的港股直通车、股指期货和香港创业股等，将会使得在11－12月期间，股票市场将出现中级调整，但大盘指数不会下降太多。
三大绝招坐稳赢家
花荣先生说，股市最普遍的操作方法有两个，一种是机构投资者和经济学家等一些大客户常用的基本面投资技术，也就是价值分析法，还有一种是中小投资者、中介信用机构常用的技术分析法。在此基础上还有其他的方法可以灵活运用到股市中，就是他的三大绝招，盲点套利、主题投资和底牌投机。
1、盲点套利指的是在容易被忽视、又是关键点的地方投资，以达到预期的盈利。盲点套利具有获得利润稳健、预期并且低风险的特点，在熊市的时候获得盈利，在牛市的时候获得暴利。
2、主题投资讲求阶段性，需要和当时股市的客观环境符合。主题投资要注意证券市场当时的关键点或是某个上市公司、某支股票的关键和主题。
3、底牌投机要注重股票受到重大社会事件的支持，或是了解可能使得股票上涨的一些因素，以此来判断股票可能上涨的空间。花荣先生说，掌握这三种方法，股市许多可能的风险将会规避，并可以保证长期收益。
证券市场到了自变期。我国股市市盈率已经达到60倍，根据其他国家的经验，市盈率突破60倍势必给股市带来一定的振荡，由此推断第四季度是股市的一个临界点，是股市新老转换的阶段。在这个阶段，蓝筹股的概念将会发生变化，不再是以往人们普遍认为的工商银行、中国联通等，可能会转向中国移动、中国石油等新的蓝筹股，这类蓝筹股权证更大、业绩更好，代表了中国股票的大趋势。蓝筹股概念的变化，以及将推迟推出的港股直通车、股指期货和香港创业股等，将会使得在11－12月期间，股票市场将出现中级调整，但大盘指数不会下降太多。
克制贪婪是炒股的必备修炼
股市已经面临很大的风险，绩优股群体积累的泡沫已经相当大了，对投资者特别是中小散户来说，现在重要的是一定要克制住贪婪的心态。"
这是杨百万见到记者的第一句话。
在与记者交谈的过程中，一位学员询问某只股票该不该抛。杨百万瞄了眼电脑，立刻说抛。此后，电脑里显示，这只股票仍在上涨。这位学员又问要不要抛。杨百万表示把剩下的继续抛。记者注意到，这位学员犹豫着一直没有最后下单。几分钟之后，该股掉头向下。杨百万向那位学员问了问情况，看着学员一脸的懊恼，感慨地说：这就是贪婪啊。
现在市场走得好象很强呀，为什么你要大叫风险呢？这个时候叫风险，不是也要冒一定的风险吗？这不是考验自己吗？记者一口气问了几个问题。
杨百万侃侃而谈："5.30"大跌之前，泡沫主要集中在那些低价、绩差、无回报的公司上。"5.30"之后，尽管指数涨到了5400点，那些低价、绩差股甚至还没有解套。这一波上来，又涨了近2000点，是以基金为主导的绩优股引领上涨。但是，绩优股上涨过大、价格过于脱离了相对于回报能力而言的价值以后，也已经蕴育了巨大的泡沫。不能说绩差股涨了是泡沫，绩优股大涨就不是泡沫。这个泡沫不加抑制，也是风险。从我的眼光来看，很多股票从回报角度来讲，已经变成了"绩优垃圾股"。基金一方面有稳定市场的作用，一方面也承担着给持有人回报的职责，也是逐利而来。但是基金这一段时间过多地追求回报，而且这种回报不是以企业的成长和效益为基础的，而是以投机炒作的方式获得的。所以我认为这个市场，从投机性来讲，已经重新面临"5.30"前的情况，只等一次重大的调整。
杨百万举例说，比如中国铝业，上市以后很快翻了两倍。从其效益和市场表现来分析，已有大资金在61元高位抛出兑现的迹象，而跟进的中小散户已经承受了从60元跌到50元的风险。所以散户不能盲目地理解所谓绩优股的价值投资，而进入"价值投机"的怪圈。
他说，应该看到管理层对这个股市是很负责任的，不愿意看到股市出现过大的泡沫。最近报纸多次发表了提示风险和强调风险教育的文章，是很有必要的。当然我们不能去猜测政策，猜测政策也是一种投机。但从政策轨迹来看，如果绩优股投机加剧，不排除会招致政策宏观调控的加强。与其等泡沫破裂，不如在泡沫将要形成的过程中，消灭其于萌芽状态。没有只涨不跌的股市，只有主动的调整才能使牛市延续得更加长久健康。我在这里呼吁，公众投资者不应漠视管理层的良苦用心和专业人士的提醒，而让贪婪的心态一叶障目。
但杨百万也不认为股市从此就会一蹶不振。在中国经济快速成长的背景下，牛市的基础还在，不必悲观。但正如老话说的：前途是光明的，道路是曲折的。他说，我相信今后的股指会屡创新高，但这与指数进行相应的调整以等待上市公司业绩的提高、等待经济的软着陆并不矛盾。
记者问现在中小投资者最需要注意的是什么。杨百万说，还是那句话：一定要抑制住贪婪。投资是一门统计学范围内的带有科学性的艺术，投机仅仅是艺术，两者如不能很好地平衡把握，投资就会失误。其中的这个度，要投资者自己去把握，不应该失误了就怨政府、怨媒体，一定要明确买者自负。如果是坚持长期投资的，那么寻找估值低的、有成长潜力的好股票后，不在乎波段的震荡，也未尝不可，但千万不要用长期投资的托辞作为贪婪的遮羞布，而股市一跌或有较大的震荡，又不坚持长期投资了，怨天尤人，甚至寻死觅活。一定要明白买者自负的道理，自己对自己负责。
说到这里，旁边有学员告诉记者，他们中就有一员在"5.30"之前不愿正视风险，也不听大家的劝告，结果后悔得用脑袋撞桌子。后来说要长期投资了，还写了保证书以示坚决，结果又忍不住在低位偷偷地抛了。杨百万说：这就是心态。
这些学员都是来跟他学技术的。但他向记者强调：要成为一个成功的投资者，技术只占30%，70%要看心态。"我下岗20年了，我始终是以一个下岗职工的平常心面对市场，始终保持风险意识。" 作为下岗职工式的平常心的一个例子，记者知道，杨百万在饭店吃饭时会拒绝需付费的袋装毛巾。"吃一顿便饭，不需要那么高级。"他说。
当记者回到办公室，打开电脑时，看到采访当天下午市场大跌，上证综指下跌了241点，市场本身似乎也在提示风险。
这是杨百万见到记者的第一句话。
在与记者交谈的过程中，一位学员询问某只股票该不该抛。杨百万瞄了眼电脑，立刻说抛。此后，电脑里显示，这只股票仍在上涨。这位学员又问要不要抛。杨百万表示把剩下的继续抛。记者注意到，这位学员犹豫着一直没有最后下单。几分钟之后，该股掉头向下。杨百万向那位学员问了问情况，看着学员一脸的懊恼，感慨地说：这就是贪婪啊。
现在市场走得好象很强呀，为什么你要大叫风险呢？这个时候叫风险，不是也要冒一定的风险吗？这不是考验自己吗？记者一口气问了几个问题。
杨百万侃侃而谈："5.30"大跌之前，泡沫主要集中在那些低价、绩差、无回报的公司上。"5.30"之后，尽管指数涨到了5400点，那些低价、绩差股甚至还没有解套。这一波上来，又涨了近2000点，是以基金为主导的绩优股引领上涨。但是，绩优股上涨过大、价格过于脱离了相对于回报能力而言的价值以后，也已经蕴育了巨大的泡沫。不能说绩差股涨了是泡沫，绩优股大涨就不是泡沫。这个泡沫不加抑制，也是风险。从我的眼光来看，很多股票从回报角度来讲，已经变成了"绩优垃圾股"。基金一方面有稳定市场的作用，一方面也承担着给持有人回报的职责，也是逐利而来。但是基金这一段时间过多地追求回报，而且这种回报不是以企业的成长和效益为基础的，而是以投机炒作的方式获得的。所以我认为这个市场，从投机性来讲，已经重新面临"5.30"前的情况，只等一次重大的调整。
杨百万举例说，比如中国铝业，上市以后很快翻了两倍。从其效益和市场表现来分析，已有大资金在61元高位抛出兑现的迹象，而跟进的中小散户已经承受了从60元跌到50元的风险。所以散户不能盲目地理解所谓绩优股的价值投资，而进入"价值投机"的怪圈。
他说，应该看到管理层对这个股市是很负责任的，不愿意看到股市出现过大的泡沫。最近报纸多次发表了提示风险和强调风险教育的文章，是很有必要的。当然我们不能去猜测政策，猜测政策也是一种投机。但从政策轨迹来看，如果绩优股投机加剧，不排除会招致政策宏观调控的加强。与其等泡沫破裂，不如在泡沫将要形成的过程中，消灭其于萌芽状态。没有只涨不跌的股市，只有主动的调整才能使牛市延续得更加长久健康。我在这里呼吁，公众投资者不应漠视管理层的良苦用心和专业人士的提醒，而让贪婪的心态一叶障目。
但杨百万也不认为股市从此就会一蹶不振。在中国经济快速成长的背景下，牛市的基础还在，不必悲观。但正如老话说的：前途是光明的，道路是曲折的。他说，我相信今后的股指会屡创新高，但这与指数进行相应的调整以等待上市公司业绩的提高、等待经济的软着陆并不矛盾。
记者问现在中小投资者最需要注意的是什么。杨百万说，还是那句话：一定要抑制住贪婪。投资是一门统计学范围内的带有科学性的艺术，投机仅仅是艺术，两者如不能很好地平衡把握，投资就会失误。其中的这个度，要投资者自己去把握，不应该失误了就怨政府、怨媒体，一定要明确买者自负。如果是坚持长期投资的，那么寻找估值低的、有成长潜力的好股票后，不在乎波段的震荡，也未尝不可，但千万不要用长期投资的托辞作为贪婪的遮羞布，而股市一跌或有较大的震荡，又不坚持长期投资了，怨天尤人，甚至寻死觅活。一定要明白买者自负的道理，自己对自己负责。
说到这里，旁边有学员告诉记者，他们中就有一员在"5.30"之前不愿正视风险，也不听大家的劝告，结果后悔得用脑袋撞桌子。后来说要长期投资了，还写了保证书以示坚决，结果又忍不住在低位偷偷地抛了。杨百万说：这就是心态。
这些学员都是来跟他学技术的。但他向记者强调：要成为一个成功的投资者，技术只占30%，70%要看心态。"我下岗20年了，我始终是以一个下岗职工的平常心面对市场，始终保持风险意识。" 作为下岗职工式的平常心的一个例子，记者知道，杨百万在饭店吃饭时会拒绝需付费的袋装毛巾。"吃一顿便饭，不需要那么高级。"他说。
当记者回到办公室，打开电脑时，看到采访当天下午市场大跌，上证综指下跌了241点，市场本身似乎也在提示风险。
Monday, October 8, 2007
嘉实基金：QDII “出海”正当时
——访嘉实海外中国股票基金拟任基金经理李凯
嘉实海外中国股票基金将于10月9日发行。因为是国内首只主投港股的基金产品，在目前港股走势强劲的形势下，该基金备受关注。嘉实海外中国股票基金拟任基金经理李凯表示，依托强劲增长的中国经济，海外上市的中国公司极具投资吸引力。
记者：当前多只QDII基金相继发行，受此利好影响，香港股市近日表现强劲，这是否会影响嘉实海外中国股票基金在港股上的配置？
李凯：近期不仅香港市场表现强劲，在美国和新加坡市场的中国上市公司表现也很好。推动市场上涨的因素一方面是美联储大幅降息，另外一方面也有中国经济持续增长、QDII出海等方面的良好预期。在这一背景下，中国上市公司最集中的香港市场受益最明显。
尽管香港市场有较大涨幅，但从全球看，估值水平仍相对合理，部分资产存在低估。从市场上涨因素看，今后较长一段时间内不会发生基本变化，因此我们对香港市场中的一些优质资产充满信心。 我们的产品定位于香港股票和在美国、新加坡上市的中国公司，其中香港市场在模拟组合中占据了较高比重。我们会按照基金合同规定，在投资策略上采取自下而上精选个股为主，自上而下资产配置为辅的方法。在建仓过程中，各个市场的影响因素各不相同，香港市场与国际成熟市场相关度较高，因此我们会密切关注美国经济变化与美国次级债影响，但我们认为香港市场仍是最看好的市场之一。
此外，嘉实海外中国股票基金投资范围除了在香港上市的H股、红筹股，还包括在美国上市的N股及在新加坡上市的S股。因而我们的股票投资比例非常灵活，具有较大的腾挪空间，目前股票库有1250只股票供我们选择，我们不会集中在涨幅已比较大的股票上。
记者：请问嘉实海外中国股票基金的投资流程是怎样的？最终的投资决策是由谁来做？
李凯：基金投资流程遵循严格、纪律性与可操作原则，在合作的过程中我们把握信息交流、独立决策的原则。首先，通过流动性和其他定量指标过滤筛选投资范围中的股票，缩小投资范围，得出200-300只可投资股票名单。其次，通过估值比较、基本面研究、定量与定性等多角度进行股票选择，得出100-200只股票列表。我们的境外投资顾问DWS（德意志集团的全资子公司）根据我们提供的股票清单帮助嘉实构建模拟组合模型。最后，由嘉实进行组合构建，并对组合进行优化得出实际股票组合。在此过程中DWS的投资建议，仅作为我们投资的参考，最终投资决策还是由嘉实自己来做。
记者：嘉实这只QDII产品有哪些优势？
李凯：嘉实这只产品主要投资于海外上市的中国公司，这是基于我们和境外投资顾问充分讨论研究，在嘉实远见、稳进的一贯原则下做出的慎重选择。这只产品优势在于：从目前全球角度选择投资机会，依托强劲增长的中国经济，投资中国仍然是最具备吸引力的主题；嘉实在过去八年，定位于中国企业的投资专家，并获得较好业绩，我们的团队对中国企业的投资，具备国际竞争力，从对投资人负责的角度出发，这是我们第一次“出海”最有信心做好的投资领域；由于主要投资于海外上市的中国企业，现金流主要是人民币计价，我们认为汇率风险最小；嘉实的境外投资顾问是嘉实的股东，这是目前QDII产品中合作最紧密的投资管理人，自2005年合资以来，我们与境外投资顾问之间的整合领先一步，有利于更好地在投资领域中合作。
嘉实海外中国股票基金将于10月9日发行。因为是国内首只主投港股的基金产品，在目前港股走势强劲的形势下，该基金备受关注。嘉实海外中国股票基金拟任基金经理李凯表示，依托强劲增长的中国经济，海外上市的中国公司极具投资吸引力。
记者：当前多只QDII基金相继发行，受此利好影响，香港股市近日表现强劲，这是否会影响嘉实海外中国股票基金在港股上的配置？
李凯：近期不仅香港市场表现强劲，在美国和新加坡市场的中国上市公司表现也很好。推动市场上涨的因素一方面是美联储大幅降息，另外一方面也有中国经济持续增长、QDII出海等方面的良好预期。在这一背景下，中国上市公司最集中的香港市场受益最明显。
尽管香港市场有较大涨幅，但从全球看，估值水平仍相对合理，部分资产存在低估。从市场上涨因素看，今后较长一段时间内不会发生基本变化，因此我们对香港市场中的一些优质资产充满信心。 我们的产品定位于香港股票和在美国、新加坡上市的中国公司，其中香港市场在模拟组合中占据了较高比重。我们会按照基金合同规定，在投资策略上采取自下而上精选个股为主，自上而下资产配置为辅的方法。在建仓过程中，各个市场的影响因素各不相同，香港市场与国际成熟市场相关度较高，因此我们会密切关注美国经济变化与美国次级债影响，但我们认为香港市场仍是最看好的市场之一。
此外，嘉实海外中国股票基金投资范围除了在香港上市的H股、红筹股，还包括在美国上市的N股及在新加坡上市的S股。因而我们的股票投资比例非常灵活，具有较大的腾挪空间，目前股票库有1250只股票供我们选择，我们不会集中在涨幅已比较大的股票上。
记者：请问嘉实海外中国股票基金的投资流程是怎样的？最终的投资决策是由谁来做？
李凯：基金投资流程遵循严格、纪律性与可操作原则，在合作的过程中我们把握信息交流、独立决策的原则。首先，通过流动性和其他定量指标过滤筛选投资范围中的股票，缩小投资范围，得出200-300只可投资股票名单。其次，通过估值比较、基本面研究、定量与定性等多角度进行股票选择，得出100-200只股票列表。我们的境外投资顾问DWS（德意志集团的全资子公司）根据我们提供的股票清单帮助嘉实构建模拟组合模型。最后，由嘉实进行组合构建，并对组合进行优化得出实际股票组合。在此过程中DWS的投资建议，仅作为我们投资的参考，最终投资决策还是由嘉实自己来做。
记者：嘉实这只QDII产品有哪些优势？
李凯：嘉实这只产品主要投资于海外上市的中国公司，这是基于我们和境外投资顾问充分讨论研究，在嘉实远见、稳进的一贯原则下做出的慎重选择。这只产品优势在于：从目前全球角度选择投资机会，依托强劲增长的中国经济，投资中国仍然是最具备吸引力的主题；嘉实在过去八年，定位于中国企业的投资专家，并获得较好业绩，我们的团队对中国企业的投资，具备国际竞争力，从对投资人负责的角度出发，这是我们第一次“出海”最有信心做好的投资领域；由于主要投资于海外上市的中国企业，现金流主要是人民币计价，我们认为汇率风险最小；嘉实的境外投资顾问是嘉实的股东，这是目前QDII产品中合作最紧密的投资管理人，自2005年合资以来，我们与境外投资顾问之间的整合领先一步，有利于更好地在投资领域中合作。
China Stocks
China index will have a play NEXT YEAR.....
I pick a few china stocks already.....but there must be story behind every counter play.
Stock always move with news.
1 of them is my CHT.....low vol....they just don't wan to move this counter..doesn't mean it dead.....in due time IT WILL MOVE. Don't buy now....hard when there is no vol...this is just an example.
Always read abt the company u r going to invest for long term....understand what their move in the near future....understand how the world work...example..what lack in china??? Water, energy, housing...etc....invest in company doing this....do ur homework well....U be better of than the person who doesn't....he will run like spider & lose a few leg in the process when it is shorted down.Try to understand the stock market & u will be fine.....I learn this after many mistakes & lost money...
Nobody teach me this when i was young & naive....I always ask Y....Y doesn't work in stock market....there is no logic Y prices move...speculative or real....doesn't matter. Important point is that U win..& don't lose money.Just my view....
I pick a few china stocks already.....but there must be story behind every counter play.
Stock always move with news.
1 of them is my CHT.....low vol....they just don't wan to move this counter..doesn't mean it dead.....in due time IT WILL MOVE. Don't buy now....hard when there is no vol...this is just an example.
Always read abt the company u r going to invest for long term....understand what their move in the near future....understand how the world work...example..what lack in china??? Water, energy, housing...etc....invest in company doing this....do ur homework well....U be better of than the person who doesn't....he will run like spider & lose a few leg in the process when it is shorted down.Try to understand the stock market & u will be fine.....I learn this after many mistakes & lost money...
Nobody teach me this when i was young & naive....I always ask Y....Y doesn't work in stock market....there is no logic Y prices move...speculative or real....doesn't matter. Important point is that U win..& don't lose money.Just my view....
Stock Market Stumble Presaged as S&P 500 Options Spread Widens
By Jeff Kearns and Michael TsangOct. 8 (Bloomberg) --
Skittishness over the U.S. stockmarket's record-setting rally is reaching a crescendo amongoptions traders who are preparing for a crash.Investors are paying the most ever to protect against adrop in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, data compiled by MorganStanley show.
The gap between the price of so-called put optionson the benchmark for U.S. equity and the cost to wager on further gains has averaged about 8 percentage points sinceAugust. That's more than the previous high in July 2001, before the index dropped 34 percent and fell to the lowest this decade.
The widening spread is a warning for OppenheimerFunds Inc.and Harris Private Bank, which oversee more than $300 billionand say the bearish bets indicate stocks may fall. The S&P 500rebounded 11 percent since Aug. 15 on speculation the worst isover for banks and homebuilders hurt by the collapse of subprimemortgages. Shares in developed markets outside the U.S. havedone even better, climbing 15 percent from their trough.
``Battle-scarred investors are buying some insurance thistime around, having the benefit of hindsight,'' said Jack Ablin,who oversees about $50 billion as chief investment officer atHarris Private Bank in Chicago. Ablin said he bought put optionsfor clients during the rally.The seven-week rebound in stocks allowed investors in S&P500 shares to recoup all the $1 trillion they lost during thebiggest plunge in four years. Global indexes fell as defaults onloans to people with poor credit and the worst U.S. housingslump in 16 years caused corporate borrowing costs to increase.The S&P 500, which dropped 9.4 percent between July andAugust, rose 2 percent last week to a record 1,557.59, eclipsingthe previous high of 1,553.08 on July 19. The Morgan StanleyCapital International EAFE Index of non-U.S. developed marketsgained 1.6 percent to 2,336.47, also ending the week at an all-time high.
Price Swings
The advance hasn't dispelled concern among traders in U.S.options. They are pricing in the highest risk of an equity-market decline since the technology-stock bubble burst at thestart of the decade, according to Carl Mason, head of U.S.equity-derivatives strategy at Morgan Stanley in New York.Mason says implied volatility, a measure that calculatesexpected price swings of an underlying asset and is used as abarometer for options prices, shows many investors are bettingthat stocks may fall.Since Aug. 15, the implied volatility of put options thatlock in gains should the S&P 500 drop at least 10 percent in sixmonths has averaged 24.08 percent, according to data from MorganStanley, the second-largest U.S. securities firm by market valueafter New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
Volatility Skew
The implied volatility on puts is 8.1 percentage pointshigher than for call options, enabling investors to profit ifthe index rises at least 10 percent in the same period. The so-called implied volatility skew climbed as high as 8.53 pointssince mid-August. That's steeper than 99 percent of all readings since the start of the decade, Morgan Stanley said. The median difference is 5.9 percentage points. The gap shows there's ``an awful lot of nervousness,'' saidMason.
``A lot of investors don't want to get caught out.''The last time the skew steepened as much was in July 2001,when it touched 8.24 percentage points, according to MorganStanley's data. In the following 15 months, the S&P 500 tumbledas the U.S. economy suffered its first recession in a decade.This time around, economic growth is also slowing,increasing the likelihood stocks will fall, according toOppenheimerFunds' Kurt Wolfgruber.
Slowing Economy
The U.S. economy expanded at an annual rate of 2.4 percentin the third quarter compared with 3.8 percent in the previousthree months, a Bloomberg survey of economists showed.
They expect growth this quarter to slow to 2.2 percent.Analysts have pared their earnings forecasts for S&P 500companies. They estimated profit growth of 0.7 percent in thethird quarter as of Oct. 4, down from 4.6 percent in mid-August.If the projections are correct, it would end a streak of 20 straight quarters of at least 10 percent growth.
Citigroup Inc., the biggest U.S. bank, last week said third-quarter profit fell 60 percent, while Merrill Lynch & Co.,the world's largest brokerage, reported its first quarterly lossin six years. Both New York-based companies cited losses on asset-backed securities and loans for leveraged buyouts.
``There's a good case to be made that the market is a bitahead of itself,'' said Wolfgruber, who oversees $265 billion as OppenheimerFunds' chief investment officer in New York. ``Things are less sanguine than they were three months ago.''Morgan Keegan & Co.'s John Wilson said interest-rate reductions by the Federal Reserve will make equities even moreattractive. The central bank lowered its benchmark lending rateon Sept. 18 by a half-percentage point to 4.75 percent, which helped to fuel the stock-market advance.
`Moving Higher'
A jobs report last week also showed that U.S. employmentincreased by 110,000 jobs in September, while revised figuresfor August showed an unexpected gain of 89,000. The change wipedout what had been the first drop in employment in four years,and lessened concern the six-year expansion will come to an end.``We're going to keep moving higher,'' said Wilson, co-director of equity strategy at Memphis, Tennessee-based MorganKeegan, which manages $120 billion. Investors are "foolishly buying'' protection, he said.
Dean Junkans, who oversees $250 billion as chief investmentofficer at Wells Fargo Private Bank in Minneapolis, says investors are putting too much faith in the Fed keeping theeconomy from slowing. The chance of policy makers cutting ratestwice by December fell to 28 percent last week, fed fundsfutures showed. Two weeks ago, prices reflected a 74 percentchance of two quarter-point rate reductions by year-end.`Hunky Dory'``Just because the Fed lowered rates doesn't mean thateverything is hunky dory,'' said Junkans.
your head and say `Gosh, it's tough to seethat it is,' based on the economic data.''Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan said last week that thechances of a U.S. recession have increased and the worst maynot be over'' for the credit markets roiled by subprime defaultsand borrowing costs that rose to a six-year high in September.
David Tice, who runs the $789 million Prudent Bear Fund in Dallas, is more pessimistic. He owns S&P 500 put options becausestocks could ``easily'' decline by more than 50 percent in thenext 12 months to 24 months.Tice says the latest rebound only delays an inevitablecrash, comparing it to when ``somebody falls out of a 95-storybuilding.''``They haven't hit the ground yet,'' he said, ``But they'regetting closer and closer.''
Skittishness over the U.S. stockmarket's record-setting rally is reaching a crescendo amongoptions traders who are preparing for a crash.Investors are paying the most ever to protect against adrop in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, data compiled by MorganStanley show.
The gap between the price of so-called put optionson the benchmark for U.S. equity and the cost to wager on further gains has averaged about 8 percentage points sinceAugust. That's more than the previous high in July 2001, before the index dropped 34 percent and fell to the lowest this decade.
The widening spread is a warning for OppenheimerFunds Inc.and Harris Private Bank, which oversee more than $300 billionand say the bearish bets indicate stocks may fall. The S&P 500rebounded 11 percent since Aug. 15 on speculation the worst isover for banks and homebuilders hurt by the collapse of subprimemortgages. Shares in developed markets outside the U.S. havedone even better, climbing 15 percent from their trough.
``Battle-scarred investors are buying some insurance thistime around, having the benefit of hindsight,'' said Jack Ablin,who oversees about $50 billion as chief investment officer atHarris Private Bank in Chicago. Ablin said he bought put optionsfor clients during the rally.The seven-week rebound in stocks allowed investors in S&P500 shares to recoup all the $1 trillion they lost during thebiggest plunge in four years. Global indexes fell as defaults onloans to people with poor credit and the worst U.S. housingslump in 16 years caused corporate borrowing costs to increase.The S&P 500, which dropped 9.4 percent between July andAugust, rose 2 percent last week to a record 1,557.59, eclipsingthe previous high of 1,553.08 on July 19. The Morgan StanleyCapital International EAFE Index of non-U.S. developed marketsgained 1.6 percent to 2,336.47, also ending the week at an all-time high.
Price Swings
The advance hasn't dispelled concern among traders in U.S.options. They are pricing in the highest risk of an equity-market decline since the technology-stock bubble burst at thestart of the decade, according to Carl Mason, head of U.S.equity-derivatives strategy at Morgan Stanley in New York.Mason says implied volatility, a measure that calculatesexpected price swings of an underlying asset and is used as abarometer for options prices, shows many investors are bettingthat stocks may fall.Since Aug. 15, the implied volatility of put options thatlock in gains should the S&P 500 drop at least 10 percent in sixmonths has averaged 24.08 percent, according to data from MorganStanley, the second-largest U.S. securities firm by market valueafter New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
Volatility Skew
The implied volatility on puts is 8.1 percentage pointshigher than for call options, enabling investors to profit ifthe index rises at least 10 percent in the same period. The so-called implied volatility skew climbed as high as 8.53 pointssince mid-August. That's steeper than 99 percent of all readings since the start of the decade, Morgan Stanley said. The median difference is 5.9 percentage points. The gap shows there's ``an awful lot of nervousness,'' saidMason.
``A lot of investors don't want to get caught out.''The last time the skew steepened as much was in July 2001,when it touched 8.24 percentage points, according to MorganStanley's data. In the following 15 months, the S&P 500 tumbledas the U.S. economy suffered its first recession in a decade.This time around, economic growth is also slowing,increasing the likelihood stocks will fall, according toOppenheimerFunds' Kurt Wolfgruber.
Slowing Economy
The U.S. economy expanded at an annual rate of 2.4 percentin the third quarter compared with 3.8 percent in the previousthree months, a Bloomberg survey of economists showed.
They expect growth this quarter to slow to 2.2 percent.Analysts have pared their earnings forecasts for S&P 500companies. They estimated profit growth of 0.7 percent in thethird quarter as of Oct. 4, down from 4.6 percent in mid-August.If the projections are correct, it would end a streak of 20 straight quarters of at least 10 percent growth.
Citigroup Inc., the biggest U.S. bank, last week said third-quarter profit fell 60 percent, while Merrill Lynch & Co.,the world's largest brokerage, reported its first quarterly lossin six years. Both New York-based companies cited losses on asset-backed securities and loans for leveraged buyouts.
``There's a good case to be made that the market is a bitahead of itself,'' said Wolfgruber, who oversees $265 billion as OppenheimerFunds' chief investment officer in New York. ``Things are less sanguine than they were three months ago.''Morgan Keegan & Co.'s John Wilson said interest-rate reductions by the Federal Reserve will make equities even moreattractive. The central bank lowered its benchmark lending rateon Sept. 18 by a half-percentage point to 4.75 percent, which helped to fuel the stock-market advance.
`Moving Higher'
A jobs report last week also showed that U.S. employmentincreased by 110,000 jobs in September, while revised figuresfor August showed an unexpected gain of 89,000. The change wipedout what had been the first drop in employment in four years,and lessened concern the six-year expansion will come to an end.``We're going to keep moving higher,'' said Wilson, co-director of equity strategy at Memphis, Tennessee-based MorganKeegan, which manages $120 billion. Investors are "foolishly buying'' protection, he said.
Dean Junkans, who oversees $250 billion as chief investmentofficer at Wells Fargo Private Bank in Minneapolis, says investors are putting too much faith in the Fed keeping theeconomy from slowing. The chance of policy makers cutting ratestwice by December fell to 28 percent last week, fed fundsfutures showed. Two weeks ago, prices reflected a 74 percentchance of two quarter-point rate reductions by year-end.`Hunky Dory'``Just because the Fed lowered rates doesn't mean thateverything is hunky dory,'' said Junkans.
your head and say `Gosh, it's tough to seethat it is,' based on the economic data.''Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan said last week that thechances of a U.S. recession have increased and the worst maynot be over'' for the credit markets roiled by subprime defaultsand borrowing costs that rose to a six-year high in September.
David Tice, who runs the $789 million Prudent Bear Fund in Dallas, is more pessimistic. He owns S&P 500 put options becausestocks could ``easily'' decline by more than 50 percent in thenext 12 months to 24 months.Tice says the latest rebound only delays an inevitablecrash, comparing it to when ``somebody falls out of a 95-storybuilding.''``They haven't hit the ground yet,'' he said, ``But they'regetting closer and closer.''
PF
My opinion is we should have a smooth ride all the way until the end of the year.....
Dow surge, STI to accelerate.
We have reached a point that most investors are convinced that the bull is back. In the coming days, the STI will break 4000, you shouldn't be surprised by this, we are only doing what Hong Kong did 2-3 weeks ago. If you see the HSI, it has rising by more than its fall in Aug.
By the same token, we should expect the STI to be able to break 4100...and this acceleration will continue until it reaches a final peak.
Like I said this will be the LAST BIG ONE.
This is an early sign but will not be the focus for the coming weeks and will not have an impact on the market until later.
You have to watch this - inflationary pressures are building up world wide not just Singapore. At some point the focus of the market will switch to inflation. It is important to keep watching this because it will mark the end of this major bull market.
Dow surge, STI to accelerate.
We have reached a point that most investors are convinced that the bull is back. In the coming days, the STI will break 4000, you shouldn't be surprised by this, we are only doing what Hong Kong did 2-3 weeks ago. If you see the HSI, it has rising by more than its fall in Aug.
By the same token, we should expect the STI to be able to break 4100...and this acceleration will continue until it reaches a final peak.
Like I said this will be the LAST BIG ONE.
This is an early sign but will not be the focus for the coming weeks and will not have an impact on the market until later.
You have to watch this - inflationary pressures are building up world wide not just Singapore. At some point the focus of the market will switch to inflation. It is important to keep watching this because it will mark the end of this major bull market.
Singapore's Economy Shows Signs of Overheating, Economists Say
Oct. 5 (Bloomberg) --
Singapore's economy risks overheating as home prices reach the highest in a decade, companies hire workers at an unprecedented pace and the stock market soars to record levels, economists say.
Inflation at a 12-year high and an economy expanding ``a little too rapidly'' mean signs of overheating are ``a few too many for comfort,'' Robert Prior-Wandesforde, an economist at HSBC Holdings Plc in Singapore, said in an Oct. 3 report.
``Consumer prices are by no means the only thing running relatively hot in the economy at present,'' Prior-Wandesforde said. ``A buoyant labor market was accompanied by strong wage growth. The Straits Times index has also risen nearly 50 percent over the last year.''
Singapore's economy grew an annualized 14.4 percent in the second quarter, the fastest pace in two years, fueled by construction and financial services. Employers added a record number of workers in the same period, pushing the jobless rate to a six-year low as service companies increased hiring.
``The overheating problem in India and China has now spilled over to Singapore,'' Deyi Tan, an economist at Morgan Stanley in Singapore, wrote in an Oct. 3 report. ``Not only has persistently strong growth resulted in an office space crunch, labor supply needs have also led to a jump in the foreign population. Residential property is booming and expat schools are oversubscribed.''
Office rents in Singapore's central business district are at record highs as financial institutions, lured to the city- state by corporate tax cuts, expand their businesses.
Home Prices
Singapore's private residential prices rose 8 percent to a 10-year high in the third quarter, the government said on Oct. 1. Home prices have increased every quarter in the past 3 1/2 years, according to data from the Urban Redevelopment Authority.
Singapore's consumer price index increased 2.9 percent in August from a year earlier, in part after an increase in the goods and services tax the month before.
The central bank expects inflation in 2007 to be between 1 percent and 2 percent, it said on Aug. 27, up from a previous range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent. Consumer prices may rise as much as 2 percent next year.
The island's longest economic expansion since 1991 and the prospect of higher salaries are prompting more Singaporeans to enter the labor force. Average monthly wages climbed 8.5 percent in the second quarter, the fastest since 2000.
Income gains are fueling consumer spending at restaurants and department stores, and may help the economy achieve the government's forecast of as much as 8 percent growth this year.
`Signs of Overheating'
The $134 billion Southeast Asian economy may expand 8.5 percent this year, and grow 7.3 percent in 2008, HSBC predicts.
``If forecasts are right and the country can look forward to another 12 months of above-trend expansion, then there will be less and less spare capacity in the economy and hence more and more signs of overheating,'' Prior-Wandesforde said.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore targets its currency instead of interest rates to guide monetary conditions and control price gains.
The central bank will probably maintain a three-year policy of allowing a ``modest and gradual'' appreciation of its currency when it reviews its policy next week, the HSBC and Morgan Stanley economists said.
The city-state's government may also take steps to cool demand for homes and ease the labor market crunch, Prior- Wandesforde said.
It may avoid waiting too long and ``act sooner rather than later'' to damp property price gains, he said. ``Increasing immigration quotas is another tool that has been used in the past to cool a hot labor market.''
A slowdown in the economies of the U.S. and others globally may also ease Singapore's risk of overheating, the analysts said.
``Singapore remains the most exposed to external conditions within Asia,'' Morgan Stanley's Tan wrote. ``The global soft- landing that lies ahead will help cool the economy.''
Singapore's economy risks overheating as home prices reach the highest in a decade, companies hire workers at an unprecedented pace and the stock market soars to record levels, economists say.
Inflation at a 12-year high and an economy expanding ``a little too rapidly'' mean signs of overheating are ``a few too many for comfort,'' Robert Prior-Wandesforde, an economist at HSBC Holdings Plc in Singapore, said in an Oct. 3 report.
``Consumer prices are by no means the only thing running relatively hot in the economy at present,'' Prior-Wandesforde said. ``A buoyant labor market was accompanied by strong wage growth. The Straits Times index has also risen nearly 50 percent over the last year.''
Singapore's economy grew an annualized 14.4 percent in the second quarter, the fastest pace in two years, fueled by construction and financial services. Employers added a record number of workers in the same period, pushing the jobless rate to a six-year low as service companies increased hiring.
``The overheating problem in India and China has now spilled over to Singapore,'' Deyi Tan, an economist at Morgan Stanley in Singapore, wrote in an Oct. 3 report. ``Not only has persistently strong growth resulted in an office space crunch, labor supply needs have also led to a jump in the foreign population. Residential property is booming and expat schools are oversubscribed.''
Office rents in Singapore's central business district are at record highs as financial institutions, lured to the city- state by corporate tax cuts, expand their businesses.
Home Prices
Singapore's private residential prices rose 8 percent to a 10-year high in the third quarter, the government said on Oct. 1. Home prices have increased every quarter in the past 3 1/2 years, according to data from the Urban Redevelopment Authority.
Singapore's consumer price index increased 2.9 percent in August from a year earlier, in part after an increase in the goods and services tax the month before.
The central bank expects inflation in 2007 to be between 1 percent and 2 percent, it said on Aug. 27, up from a previous range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent. Consumer prices may rise as much as 2 percent next year.
The island's longest economic expansion since 1991 and the prospect of higher salaries are prompting more Singaporeans to enter the labor force. Average monthly wages climbed 8.5 percent in the second quarter, the fastest since 2000.
Income gains are fueling consumer spending at restaurants and department stores, and may help the economy achieve the government's forecast of as much as 8 percent growth this year.
`Signs of Overheating'
The $134 billion Southeast Asian economy may expand 8.5 percent this year, and grow 7.3 percent in 2008, HSBC predicts.
``If forecasts are right and the country can look forward to another 12 months of above-trend expansion, then there will be less and less spare capacity in the economy and hence more and more signs of overheating,'' Prior-Wandesforde said.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore targets its currency instead of interest rates to guide monetary conditions and control price gains.
The central bank will probably maintain a three-year policy of allowing a ``modest and gradual'' appreciation of its currency when it reviews its policy next week, the HSBC and Morgan Stanley economists said.
The city-state's government may also take steps to cool demand for homes and ease the labor market crunch, Prior- Wandesforde said.
It may avoid waiting too long and ``act sooner rather than later'' to damp property price gains, he said. ``Increasing immigration quotas is another tool that has been used in the past to cool a hot labor market.''
A slowdown in the economies of the U.S. and others globally may also ease Singapore's risk of overheating, the analysts said.
``Singapore remains the most exposed to external conditions within Asia,'' Morgan Stanley's Tan wrote. ``The global soft- landing that lies ahead will help cool the economy.''
Sunday, October 7, 2007
Who is Phillip Fisher?
Philip Arthur Fisher was a very successful stock investor best known as the author of Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, a guide to investing that has remained in print ever since it was first published in 1958.
His money management company, Fisher & Co., was founded in 1931.Philip Fisher is considered a pioneer in the field of growth investing. Morningstar has called him "one of the great investors of all time".
In Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, Fisher said that the best time to sell a stock was "almost never".
Best Quote By Fisher: I do not want a lot of good investments, I want a few outstanding ones. If a job has been correctly done when the common stock has been purchased, the time to sell it is almost never.
Fisher hated to sell good companies. He argued that if a stock becomes over priced investors should sit down with it rather then sell the stock with a view to buy it back at a lower price. He discouraged selling in anticipation of a market fall.
His most famous investment was his purchase of Motorola, a company he bought in 1955 when it was a radio manufacturer and held until his death in March, 2004 at the age of 96.
Perhaps the most well-known of Fisher's followers is Warren Buffett.
His money management company, Fisher & Co., was founded in 1931.Philip Fisher is considered a pioneer in the field of growth investing. Morningstar has called him "one of the great investors of all time".
In Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, Fisher said that the best time to sell a stock was "almost never".
Best Quote By Fisher: I do not want a lot of good investments, I want a few outstanding ones. If a job has been correctly done when the common stock has been purchased, the time to sell it is almost never.
Fisher hated to sell good companies. He argued that if a stock becomes over priced investors should sit down with it rather then sell the stock with a view to buy it back at a lower price. He discouraged selling in anticipation of a market fall.
His most famous investment was his purchase of Motorola, a company he bought in 1955 when it was a radio manufacturer and held until his death in March, 2004 at the age of 96.
Perhaps the most well-known of Fisher's followers is Warren Buffett.
The Fall 2007 Rally by Ken Fisher
The article was written for Forbes.com by Ken Fisher on 17 September 2007.
The Fall 2007 RallyDon't let this fall's rally whiz right by you before you take a close look at stocks from Asia. The midsummer correction--at one point on Aug. 16 the Morgan Stanley World Index was down 12.5% from its 2007 high--provided a great time to get into stocks on the other side of the dateline.
If you don't own this region, now is the time to get in.
When the rally resumes, Asia will lead. These stocks are to this market what tech stocks were to the mid-1990s.
What makes me so sure that we're in a rally, not a long-running decline?
Four things.
The first has to do with the shape of a bull market termination. The final peak does not arrive sharply. It tends to have a gentle upward slope, as the final but diminishing round of suckers is drawn in. And then the decline (usually) begins with a gentle slope, too (October 1987 was the exception proving the rule--over almost instantly), as some buyers continue to come in even after the bull market is over. The bull market leading up to the July 16 peak was too sudden and the plunge too sharp to presage a real bear market.
Second, bear markets don't start from old news. In this case the old news is that many subprime borrowers are going to default on their mortgages. While this misfortune is still unfolding, the basic facts have been out for a while. A fundamental rule of markets is that old news runs out of power. It takes new information to move stock prices.
Third, it usually takes a severe credit crunch to set a genuine bear market in motion. This credit crunch, at least for corporate borrowers, is not severe. You measure crunch by the spread in yields between junk bonds and Treasury bonds of like maturity. In 2000 that spread widened by three to four percentage points, a harbinger of both a broad tumble in stock prices and an economic contraction. In that case, moreover, the widening spread came atop rising Treasury interest rates--weak corporate borrowers had two strikes against them. Contrast that with what's happening now. Junk spreads widened by only a percentage point before going back the other way, and much of the widening was from a fall in Treasury rates, hardly bearish. This is a phony credit crunch.
Fourth, the media always jump on a short-term correction but rarely wake up to a long-term bear market in its early phases. One form of this media attention is trotting out the perma-bears to deliver their "I told you so" speeches to the tv cameras, with scenes of the New York Stock Exchange running in the background. Generally speaking, the friendly interviewer conducting the show neglects to ask the bear when he first turned bearish and how much the market is up since then.
As with all corrections, a few months from now we will be wondering what the fuss was about. And Asian and Indian stocks will be much higher.
Who is Ken Fisher is why should we take his words seriously?
Kenneth L. Fisher was born on November 29, 1950 in San Francisco, California.
Ken is the third and youngest son of Philip A. Fisher, renowned investor and author of classic investing book, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, which remains relevant and in print to this day.Ken is the only industry professional his father ever professionally trained, having worked for his father in the early 1970s.
Ken is currently ranked 297th on the 2006 Forbes 400 list of richest Americans.
The Fall 2007 RallyDon't let this fall's rally whiz right by you before you take a close look at stocks from Asia. The midsummer correction--at one point on Aug. 16 the Morgan Stanley World Index was down 12.5% from its 2007 high--provided a great time to get into stocks on the other side of the dateline.
If you don't own this region, now is the time to get in.
When the rally resumes, Asia will lead. These stocks are to this market what tech stocks were to the mid-1990s.
What makes me so sure that we're in a rally, not a long-running decline?
Four things.
The first has to do with the shape of a bull market termination. The final peak does not arrive sharply. It tends to have a gentle upward slope, as the final but diminishing round of suckers is drawn in. And then the decline (usually) begins with a gentle slope, too (October 1987 was the exception proving the rule--over almost instantly), as some buyers continue to come in even after the bull market is over. The bull market leading up to the July 16 peak was too sudden and the plunge too sharp to presage a real bear market.
Second, bear markets don't start from old news. In this case the old news is that many subprime borrowers are going to default on their mortgages. While this misfortune is still unfolding, the basic facts have been out for a while. A fundamental rule of markets is that old news runs out of power. It takes new information to move stock prices.
Third, it usually takes a severe credit crunch to set a genuine bear market in motion. This credit crunch, at least for corporate borrowers, is not severe. You measure crunch by the spread in yields between junk bonds and Treasury bonds of like maturity. In 2000 that spread widened by three to four percentage points, a harbinger of both a broad tumble in stock prices and an economic contraction. In that case, moreover, the widening spread came atop rising Treasury interest rates--weak corporate borrowers had two strikes against them. Contrast that with what's happening now. Junk spreads widened by only a percentage point before going back the other way, and much of the widening was from a fall in Treasury rates, hardly bearish. This is a phony credit crunch.
Fourth, the media always jump on a short-term correction but rarely wake up to a long-term bear market in its early phases. One form of this media attention is trotting out the perma-bears to deliver their "I told you so" speeches to the tv cameras, with scenes of the New York Stock Exchange running in the background. Generally speaking, the friendly interviewer conducting the show neglects to ask the bear when he first turned bearish and how much the market is up since then.
As with all corrections, a few months from now we will be wondering what the fuss was about. And Asian and Indian stocks will be much higher.
Who is Ken Fisher is why should we take his words seriously?
Kenneth L. Fisher was born on November 29, 1950 in San Francisco, California.
Ken is the third and youngest son of Philip A. Fisher, renowned investor and author of classic investing book, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, which remains relevant and in print to this day.Ken is the only industry professional his father ever professionally trained, having worked for his father in the early 1970s.
Ken is currently ranked 297th on the 2006 Forbes 400 list of richest Americans.
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